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Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts 
Paul Holland  
INTRODUCTION 
In the two decades since the inception of the Dade County 
(Florida) Drug Court, the modern problem-solving court approach 
has moved rapidly from the fringes to the mainstream, transforming 
practice in hundreds of courthouses,
1
 encompassing new classes of 
cases (e.g., domestic violence and crimes committed by those with 
mental illness) and reshaping conventional criminal courts.
2 
These 
new-model courts offer individuals accused of criminal conduct the 
promise of one intensive, extended, and transformative interaction 
with the criminal justice system instead of a lifetime of repeated, 
brief, and ineffectual encounters. The evidence in support of this 
approach is slowly mounting, albeit still subject to debate.
3
 What is 
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 1. Robert V. Wolf, A New Way of Doing Business: A Conversation about the Statewide 
Coordination of Problem-Solving Courts, 2 J. CT. INNOVATION 191, 192 (2009) (―By 2004, 
there were more than 2,500 problem-solving courts in the United States.‖). 
 2. See Donald J. Farole, Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving Principles In Mainstream 
Courts: Lessons For State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 61 (2005) (―Most judges . . . agreed that 
their own problem-solving court experience enhanced the frequency and effectiveness of their 
subsequent use of problem-solving principles and practices in conventional courts.‖); AUBREY 
FOX & ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE FUTURE OF DRUG COURTS: HOW 
STATES ARE MAINSTREAMING THE DRUG COURT MODEL (2004). 
 3. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, EXPANDING THE USE OF 
PROBLEM SOLVING: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE‘S COMMUNITY-BASED PROBLEM-
SOLVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE 1 (2007) (―[R]esearch suggested that problem-solving 
courts, such as drug courts and community courts, had helped decrease recidivism, reduce 
crime, improve coordination among justice agencies, enhance services to victims, and increase 
trust in the justice system.‖). Wolf works for the Center for Court Innovation, which has been 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 34:185 
 
 
unmistakable is the reconfiguration of criminal practice that the new 
approach requires. Along with all other justice system actors (e.g., 
judges, probation officers), lawyers in problem-solving courts find 
themselves thrust into new activities and, more importantly, new 
relationships. Erstwhile adversaries are expected to function as 
members of a single team with a shared mission.
4
 Success in this new 
practice setting requires lawyers, especially defense attorneys, to 
reexamine and replace some of their most deeply ingrained habits of 
mind and action. Clinical teachers have an important responsibility to 
translate these fundamental changes in the world of practice into the 
law school curriculum, providing students with an opportunity to 
both learn and test the new approach. 
Many defense attorneys, including several clinician-scholars, have 
resisted these changes, seeing in them an existential threat to the role 
of defense counsel. Arguing that the new paradigm confuses, 
marginalizes, and essentially silences lawyers,
5
 these critics claim 
 
instrumental in developing and advocating for the problem-solving model. The Center‘s 
analysis is nevertheless credible, even though not conclusive, finding support in and 
acknowledging unbiased and even self-consciously skeptical researchers. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‘T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES 
RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES (2005); STEVEN 
BELENKO, NAT‘L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., 
RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 UPDATE 1 (2001) (―Drug use and 
criminal activity are relatively reduced while participants are in the program. Less clear are the 
long-term post-program impacts of drug courts on recidivism and other outcomes.‖). But see 
Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and 
Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 57, 66–67 (2009) 
(detailing limitations of this effectiveness research). 
 4. See, e.g., MICHAEL THOMPSON, FRED OSHER & DENISE TOMASINI-JOSHI, IMPROVING 
RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL 
HEALTH COURT 8 (2007) (―The mental health court team works collaboratively to help 
participants achieve treatment goals . . . . Team members should work together on each 
participant‘s case and contribute to the court‘s administration to ensure its smooth 
functioning.‖); NAT‘L ASSOC. OF DRUG COURT PROF‘LS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING 
DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 3 (1997) (―Using a nonadversarial approach, 
prosecution and defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants‘ due 
process rights.‖). 
 5. See, e.g., Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving 
Courts and the Impending Crisis Of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1482–83 (2004); 
Tamar M. Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of 
the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 93 (2007); Mae C. Quinn, Whose 
Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 
26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 55–56 (2000–2001). Some prominent defenders have 
played a significant role in developing and promoting the new model. See, e.g., Lisa 
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that the new courts deprive defendants of an essential layer of 
protection. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) recently published a report based on two years of task 
force hearings into problem-solving court practice around the 
country.
6
 Like the scholarly literature that it cites, the report raises 
legitimate concerns over many features of these courts, including 
eligibility standards, sentencing practices, and differential access 
among racial and ethnic groups to the benefits the courts offer.
7
 
Relatively sanguine about mental health courts,
8
 the NACDL Task 
Force thoroughly repudiates drug courts, calling for their abolition. In 
its assessment of problem-solving court practice, the NACDL Report, 
like much of the literature that preceded it, reflects a rigid adherence 
to a narrow conception of the attorney‘s role in criminal 
proceedings—that of the steadfast, combative, and protective 
champion. This Article calls on clinical law teachers to play a critical 
mediating role in redefining the practices—and the identity—of 
defense attorneys within these new courts, while preserving the 
values that underlie the traditional role. Precisely because of their 
long-standing collaboration with the defender community, clinics 
working in problem-solving courts can help advance defenders‘ 
concerns while opening them up for analysis and testing at the same 
time that they subject problem-solving justice to equally rigorous 
scrutiny. 
 
Schreibersdorf, A Public Defender in a Problem-Solving Court, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 401, 409 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 
2007). Likewise, Professors Bruce Winick and David Wexler, pioneers in the development of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, have adapted that approach to the specific issue of the defender‘s role 
in problem-solving courts. See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem 
Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 743 (2005). 
 6. NAT‘L ASS‘N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA‘S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: 
THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 8–9 (2009) [hereinafter 
NACDL REPORT]. The transcripts of these hearings, which are cited frequently in this Article, 
can be viewed at NACDL Problem-Solving Task Force: Hearings Transcript, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/drugcourts (follow ―Hearings Transcript‖ 
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter NACDL Hearings]. 
 7. NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (―Too often it seems that drug court eligibility 
and admission criteria serve to exclude mostly indigent and minority defendants. Drug courts 
must address these fundamental and disturbing disparities.‖). 
 8. Id. at 50–52. 
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With a clearly expressed commitment to continuous improvement, 
the modern problem-solving court movement invites such scrutiny 
and distinguishes itself from similarly ambitious but less well-
conceived efforts in the past.
9
 Alongside the controversial team 
approach, problem-solving court advocates have articulated a 
commitment to collecting data and analyzing outcomes.
10
 Many 
proponents of the model recognize the inadequacy of mere good 
intentions
11
 and the necessity of an effective feedback system. To 
take but one example, at roughly the same time that NACDL 
published its critical report, the Center for Court Innovation, the 
intellectual and policy nerve center of the problem-solving court 
movement, published an article raising concerns over unequal access 
to problem-solving courts for defendants of different racial and ethnic 
groups.
12
 This reflects a self-critical design and a level of 
responsiveness without parallel in earlier experiments with problem-
solving courts and rarely seen within the traditional justice system.
13
 
 
 9. The juvenile court is an obvious and oft-cited precursor to modern problem-solving 
approaches. See Casey, supra note 5, at 1464 (―In many ways, the juvenile courts were the 
original problem-solving courts . . . .‖). Mae Quinn has uncovered and examined a hitherto 
―forgotten history‖ of similar reform, the mid-twentieth century efforts of Anne Moskowitz 
Kross to establish specialty courts in New York City. Quinn, supra note 3, at 69–80. 
 10. ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM-SOLVING 
JUSTICE 8 (2007) (―The active and ongoing collection and analysis of data—measuring 
outcomes and process, costs and benefits—are crucial tools for evaluating the effectiveness of 
operations and encouraging continuous improvement.‖). 
 11. The juvenile court experience stands as one example of the necessity of close scrutiny 
even when designers of an alternative model of adjudication profess benevolent intent. See In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1967) (―Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened 
impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. 
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to say the least—debatable. 
And in practice . . . the results have not been entirely satisfactory.‖). Not all modern problem-
solving court proponents have internalized these lessons, lapsing, self-parodically, into the 
Juvenile Court‘s sorry history of reform by euphemism. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the 
Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 439, 470 (denying the seemingly indisputable coercive nature of even short-term 
incarceration: ―Smart punishment is not really punishment at all, but a therapeutic response to 
the realistic behavior of drug offenders in the grip of addiction.‖). 
 12. Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT‘L BLACK L.J. 27 
(2009). 
 13. In important respects, the most thoughtful proponents of problem-solving courts have 
internalized the most forceful criticism of their forerunners and have charted the course of 
―better informed, more balanced, and truly thoughtful discourse‖ that leading opponents have 
demanded. Quinn, supra note 3, at 81–82. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts 189 
 
 
This commitment to self-assessment ought to attract the activities of 
clinical law teachers, who have built their pedagogy upon the premise 
that students can best understand, assess, and transcend the 
assumptions ingrained within the practice of law and the 
administration of justice through engaged and reflective participation 
in both.
14
 
Part I of the Article introduces the core principles and practices of 
problem-solving courts, including the reconfigured roles of judges 
and lawyers. This is followed by a focused examination of the heated 
rhetorical
15
 battle regarding the fate of the traditional image of 
defender-as-champion in this new paradigm. The testimony given to 
the NACDL Task Force as to what is actually happening in courts 
across the country exposed a gap between the concerns expressed by 
many defenders and the actual experiences of defendants and their 
lawyers in such courts. The Author‘s observations of problem-
solving practice, made in preparation for launching a Mental Health 
Court Clinic
16
 and reported in pertinent parts within, likewise belied 
many of the concerns of problem-solving court opponents. Part I 
concludes by offering an alternative vision for defenders in problem-
solving courts: counsel as advocates within an inter-disciplinary 
network. The networked lawyer does not always speak with the tone 
or language of a traditional champion, but she does not compromise 
the interests of clients or her own sense of personal and professional 
accomplishment. In fact, it is only through learning a new language 
of influence that today‘s defenders can establish for themselves a 
 
 14. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) (tracing development of clinics to recognition that traditional legal 
pedagogy ―failed to develop in students ways of thinking within and about the role of 
lawyers‖); Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 138 (1993–1995) (―By examining role characteristics, we 
grasp those aspects of a role that powerfully shape our own understanding and behavior.‖). 
 15. This contest is not merely rhetorical. In 2009, the Maryland Public Defender argued 
that the Baltimore City Adult Felony Drug Treatment Court‘s operation violated separation of 
powers and due process concerns. Brown v. State, 971 A.2d 932 (Md. 2009). The court did not 
squarely address either issue in denying the particular petitioner‘s challenge. 
 16. In the Spring of 2010, Seattle University School of Law opened its Mental Health 
Court Clinic, in partnership with Associated Counsel for the Accused, a non-profit public 
defense firm. For a more complete description of this court, see ERIC TRUPIN ET AL., CITY OF 
SEATTLE MUN. COURT, MENTAL HEALTH COURT EVALUATION REPORT (2001), available at 
http://cityofseattle.net/courts/pdf/MHReport.pdf. 
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position of importance comparable to that which they have long held 
in conventional courts. 
Part II maps the path toward greater and more effective 
participation by law school clinics in problem-solving courts. Clinics 
and problem-solving courts each stand as an alternative to a deeply 
entrenched institution. Each has achieved a degree of mainstream 
acceptance
17
, and they reveal seemingly complementary animating 
spirits. Nevertheless, problem-solving courts and law school clinics 
have surprisingly little shared history.
18
 This Article will examine the 
application of core principles and methods of clinical teaching to this 
new setting. Like the defenders confronting the changing rules of 
practice, clinicians will need to modify, refine, and perhaps even 
abandon familiar methods. However, through principled adaptation, 
clinicians can better prepare students for this expanding field of 
practice and also help redesign the field, holding the system 
accountable and demonstrating the distinctive contributions that 
reflective, resourceful defenders can play. 
 
 17. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 34–43 (2007). This landmark work calls for greater integration of the 
clinical and traditional approaches and highlights two schools (City University of New York 
and New York University) that have succeeded in doing so. 
 18. The website of the Center for Court Innovation contains a list of law school courses, 
clinical and otherwise, that are related somewhat to problem-solving justice. Law School 
Courses in Problem-Solving Justice and Related Topics, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=document.listDocument&documentTopi
cID=31&documentTypeID=10 (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). The Conference of Chief Justices 
of State Court Administrators has issued a call for far more curricular reform along these lines. 
Resolution 22: In Support of Problem-Solving Principles and Methods, CONFERENCE OF CHIEF 
JUSTICES, 3 (July 29, 2004), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/CourtAdminResolutions/ProblemSolving 
CourtPrinciplesAndMethods.pdf (calling on the Association of American Law Schools to 
―support expanded education by their members on the principles and methods of problem-
solving courts‖); see also Symposium, The Judicial Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2011, 
2018 (2002). In this panel discussion, Judge William Schma urged legal educators  
to get past the stage where therapeutic jurisprudence and those kinds of things are 
simply seminar courses that a few goofballs take because they don‘t want to take some 
other seminar course. These have to be part of the traditional role of raising lawyers so 
that it becomes a part of their self-concept and they understand how they fit into the 
social system. 
Id. 
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I. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: TOWARD A NEW FORM OF JUSTICE 
A. The Vision 
Problem-solving court proponents ―seek to use the authority of 
courts to address the underlying problems of individual litigants, the 
structural problems of the justice system, and the social problems of 
communities.‖19 Because the modern problem-solving court 
movement emerged as a response to the handling of drug crimes, the 
drug court model serves as a useful template for describing the basic 
framework. Generally, courts have processed cases involving drug-
related crimes (e.g., possession of illegal drugs or offenses, such as 
theft, committed to support a drug habit) in substantially the same 
manner as other criminal cases. Most defendants pled guilty, often 
fairly quickly, and were placed on probation or in prison. Because 
neither the probationary nor prison sentences addressed the 
underlying substance abuse problem, defendants would emerge from 
the process no better equipped to avoid further criminal behavior than 
they entered it. The system‘s inadequacy, perhaps even toxicity, 
prompted one judge to caustically observe, ―You know, I feel like I 
work for McJustice: we sure aren‘t good for you, but we are fast.‖20  
In a problem-solving drug court, defendants are assessed to 
determine whether their alleged criminal conduct was linked to 
untreated substance abuse. In exchange for the opportunity to receive 
treatment as part of the process of resolving their criminal case, 
defendants are required to submit to an extended period of judicial 
supervision during which interim sanctions (including short jail stays) 
may be imposed or rewards could be granted. Those who succeed 
have their charges reduced or dismissed or their convictions vacated. 
 
 19. Panel Discussion, What Is A Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000) [hereinafter Panel Discussion]; see also COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV‘TS JUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 8 (2008) (―They seek to use the authority of the court to encourage defendants 
with mental illnesses to engage in treatment and to adhere to medication regimens to avoid 
violating conditions of supervision or committing new crimes.‖). 
 20. Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Kathleen Blatz shared this now-famous observation, 
which she attributed to a colleague. Panel Discussion, supra note 19, at 80. 
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Failure, if prolonged or severe enough to warrant termination from 
the program, results in traditional sanctions.
21
 
The introduction of the problem-solving drug court was more a 
matter of pragmatic improvisation than methodical theoretical 
design.
22
 In time, this innovation and the political movement behind 
it became enmeshed with the developing theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.
23
 The central premises of therapeutic jurisprudence are 
that interactions with the justice system necessarily have an impact 
on an individual‘s psychological or emotional well-being and that the 
system should be designed to minimize emotional or psychological 
harm and maximize benefit to the extent possible consistent with 
other system objectives.
24
 Viewed in this light, the traditional 
handling of drug-related cases amounted to a significant missed 
opportunity for personal transformation and community 
improvement.
25
  
 
 21. The NACDL Report demonstrates that, in many instances, treatment court participants 
who fail to change their behavior ultimately receive harsher sanctions than defendants who opt 
to remain in conventional courts and never even attempt treatment. NACDL REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 29. This imbalance is in no way inherent in the design or concept of problem-solving 
courts and ought to be eliminated, as NACDL suggests. 
 22. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 875, 945 (2003) (―Is there any justification for choosing experimentalist courts rather than 
experimentalist agencies? The short answer, as with other broken institutions, is necessity. As a 
matter of first principle, there will often be no good reason to prefer problem-solving courts to 
problem-solving agencies; in fact, the latter may be the more appropriate tool. However, 
politics and legislative inertia will often prevent the creation of an appropriate agency—which 
leaves courts to fill the gap.‖); see also Panel Discussion, supra note 19, at 80 (quoting D.C. 
Superior Court Judge Truman Morrison: ―In very large measure, this is happening because of 
the abject failure of the other branches of government.‖); Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A 
Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 507, 511 (2005) (defending 
mental health court as ―a pragmatic solution that I favor over the alternative, the criminalization 
of mental health problems‖). For a more cynical view of the origins of the modern movement, 
see Quinn, supra note 3, at 63 (asserting that the movement began because court leaders needed 
to eliminate jail overcrowding). 
 23. See Winick, supra note 5, at 1090 (describing a ―symbiotic relationship‖ between the 
concepts); see also Hora et al., supra note 11; JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: 
THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 47, 187 (2001) (arguing that a therapeutic 
orientation attunes problem-solving justice with a dominant strain in modern American culture). 
But see GREG BERMAN ET AL., GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 51–
52 (2005) (observing that there is ―not a perfect fit‖ between the two approaches).  
 24. See LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); Winick, supra note 5, at 1081–82. 
 25. Winick, supra note 5, at 1081 (―The individual‘s arrest and need to face criminal 
charges can present the pressures needed to create such a teachable moment or therapeutic 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/6
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The extent to which this therapeutic orientation has come to 
define the problem-solving approach
26
 is evident from this reflection 
from a defense attorney practicing in a mental health court (i.e., a 
court addressing crimes allegedly committed by the mentally ill): 
Recently, the judge, the social worker, the assistant district 
attorney, and I discussed with each other and with the client 
her need for hospitalization. She was so depressed that she did 
not have the strength to take her medication as the judge had 
ordered. The kindness and compassion that were expressed 
towards this woman stood in stark contrast to what would be 
more likely to occur in another courtroom—the shackling of a 
client and removal of that person to jail for failing to comply 
with the judge‘s directive.27 
A close look at this description reveals the extent to which 
problem-solving justice reorients the judicial process. The comment 
focuses on the client‘s ―need‖ and the professionals‘ goodwill (i.e., 
their ―kindness and compassion‖). There is no discussion of the 
defendant‘s guilt or the lawyers‘ (or judge‘s) analysis. The verbs 
used—specifically, ―discussed‖ and ―expressed‖—describe activities 
more closely associated with a therapist‘s office than a courtroom, 
such as the hypothetical courtroom that the defender invokes for 
contrast, in which the primary issue is the defendant‘s action (or 
failure to act) and in which the judge wields power bluntly, 
constrained to do little but order merciless (or at the very least, 
dispassionate) shackling.
28
  
 
opportunity in which the individual is ready to contemplate change, accept responsibility for 
wrongdoing, and consider making a genuine commitment to rehabilitation.‖). 
 26. As this therapeutic orientation is central to distinguishing problem-solving courts from 
conventional ones, this Article will focus on courts addressing conditions, such as substance 
abuse or mental illness, which are commonly conceived of as treatable. The Article will not 
discuss the applicability of problem-solving approaches (or even the label) to other specialty 
courts, such as those involving domestic violence, which the NACDL Report sharply denigrates 
with the label ―problem-shifting.‖ NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.  
 27. Schreibersdorf, supra note 5, at 409.  
 28. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1618–21 (1986).  
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B. Problem-Solving Judging: Performing Authority 
The fusion of justice and therapy in problem-solving courts has 
altered the roles and relationships of all participants. As put in its 
strongest form by two drug court proponents, ―[t]he drug offender 
becomes a client of the court, and judge, prosecutor, and defense 
counsel must shed their traditional roles and take on roles that will 
facilitate an offender's recovery from the disease of addiction.‖29 
Seeing a defendant as ―a client of the court‖ marks a radical change 
from the traditional notion of the judge as a ―detached, neutral 
referee.‖30 The ―client of the court‖ label also connotes a consumerist 
understanding of the defendant‘s experience which further situates 
problem-solving courts within the ―dominant strain(s)‖31 of modern 
American culture. The defendant, the person whose alleged unlawful 
actions have given rise to the proceedings, can assert a legitimate 
expectation of receiving services from the process.  
Judges in these courts do not spend much time performing 
traditional judicial tasks, such as finding facts and interpreting law.
32
 
Instead, they ―verify that the exhaustive information on the progress 
of each defendant . . . comports with [their] own perception and . . . 
ritualize the imposition of graduated rewards or punishments.
33
 
Instead of assessing contested stories from competing parties, the 
judge typically receives a consensus report from the court ―team.‖ 
 
 29. Hora et al., supra note 11, at 469; see also BERMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 33 
(―[Problem-solving courts] ask judges and attorneys to do more than just apply the law 
correctly . . . . [They must] broaden their scope to see the real-life consequences of courtroom 
decisions.‖); Dorf, supra note 22, at 980 (―[Problem-solving courts] point the way toward an 
understanding of the legal process as the collective search for practical solutions.‖). 
 30. Hora et al., supra note 11, at 469; see also BERMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 80 
(―We‘re no longer the referee or the spectator. We‘re a participant in the process.‖). 
 31. See NOLAN, supra note 23. 
 32. Dorf, supra note 22, at 940 (―[A]lmost no decision made by a problem-solving court 
requires the application of unguided judgment. . . . There is very little judging in the sense of 
making a non-mechanical decision.‖). Contra Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as 
Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
93, 104 (2007) (―[M]ental health court judges are not acting as impartial arbiters, but as 
dynamic risk managers.‖). Talesh and Dorf may both be correct, at least in part, with the 
divergence in their descriptions (i.e., ―mechanical‖ versus ―dynamic‖), indicating how novel 
and still somewhat elusive this new model of judicial activity is. 
 33. Dorf, supra note 22, at 940. 
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The report offers a summary of the participant‘s performance since 
he or she was last before the court. It is this report, produced through 
the pre-hearing staffing process, described more within, that the 
judge must verify when he or she encounters the ―client‖ herself. This 
verification is not merely a matter of establishing or checking facts. 
Indeed, the judge‘s task is more complex, not readily discernible by 
clear proof nor reducible to a conclusive articulation. The judge is 
essentially assessing the person‘s commitment to and capacity for 
transformation, something that neither legal education nor judicial 
experience necessarily prepares the judge to do. Assuming the judge 
determines that the team‘s report has accurately charted the 
participant‘s compliance, the judge‘s task is to communicate with the 
participant in a way that induces the desired future behavior 
(specifically, consistency for those who are succeeding, and change 
for those who are struggling). 
―Hearing‖ is an inadequate term for these court encounters, as it 
suggests the traditional judicial function of receiving information and 
argument. Having surveyed drug courts around the country, James 
Nolan has demonstrated how judges self-consciously employ the 
metaphor of theater to describe their activity, with an emphasis on 
projecting a message rather than reaching a decision.
34
 Each 
encounter with a participant is an episode with significance for the 
individual participant before the court, as well as the rest of the 
audience, i.e., the entire community of participants present in the 
courtroom. One judge has described a day‘s work as ―orchestrated. 
 
 34. NOLAN, supra note 23, at 61 (quoting Judge Jamey Weitzman: ―Drug courts, it has 
been said many times, are theater. And the judge is the stage director and one of the primary 
actors.‖); id. at 70 (―[D]rug court judges very consciously conceive of the drug court as 
theater.‖). Both proponents and opponents of the courts confirm this observation. See BERMAN 
ET AL., supra note 23, at 69 (describing how a community court judge who masked his 
skepticism about defendant for dramatic effect engaged in ―a form of public theater aimed at the 
broader audience in the courtroom and the community at large‖); NACDL REPORT, supra note 
6, at 71 n.352 (quoting testimony of Tim Murray, Executive Director, Pretrial Justice Institute: 
―Unfortunately, one of the aspects of drug court, undeniably, is the element of theater. It‘s a big 
part. We didn‘t realize it when we started, but the drug courts are great theater.‖); Winick, 
supra note 5, at 1060 (―Not only is the judge a leading actor in the therapeutic drama, but . . . 
the judge also assumes the role of director, coordinating the roles of many of the actors, 
providing a needed motivation for how they will play their parts, and inspiring them to play 
them well.‖). 
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It‘s a show. You are putting on a show.‖35 Another advises colleagues 
to shape their calendars ―as you would a play, with a beginning, a 
middle, and an end.‖36 Unlike the jumble of unrelated and 
haphazardly sequenced events one might see in a traditional 
courtroom, ―the drama should flow in such a way that 
offenders/clients are conveyed a certain narrative that contains a 
central message.‖37  
The judge may be, as Bruce Winick has written, both the ―leading 
actor‖ in this drama and the ―director‖ as well,38 but as in a theatrical 
production, the director‘s vision and the star‘s portrayal build upon 
the prosaic, often unseen, efforts of others. Problem-solving court 
judges can exercise artful directorial control over their calendars 
because of the work done in the pre-court meetings, events that have 
no analog in conventional courts. At these meetings, representatives 
of the court (judge, probation officers, and other court services 
personnel), lawyers for the state and the defendant/participant, and 
affiliated treatment providers share information about each 
participant and discuss what action the court should take.
39
 Options 
range from termination (with traditional punishment) to successful 
discharge or, as it is often termed, ―graduation.‖40 Most of the time, 
of course, the team must address the broad array of options in 
 
 35. NOLAN, supra note 23, at 71. 
 36. Id. at 70. This judge goes on to advise that it is beneficial to start the calendar with the 
cases of participants who have not performed well, so as to communicate the consequences of 
noncompliance to other clients in the audience. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also Bruce Winick & Ken Kress, Special Theme: Preventive Outpatient 
Commitment for Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 107, 126 
(2003) (―Not only does the individual benefit from these sessions, but so does the audience in 
the courtroom, which typically includes other mental health court participants in various stages 
of treatment and processing, who may be experiencing similar problems.‖). The notion that a 
―message‖ or line of meaning ties together a string of events is one of the central insights of 
narrative lawyering theory, an important vein of clinical legal scholarship. Ty Alper et al., 
Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2005).  
 38. Winick, supra note 5, at 1060. 
 39. On this point, Nolan, who generally assumes a non-ideological stance with regard to 
the existence and operation of problem-solving courts, suggests a somewhat sinister undertone: 
―In the backstage, practitioners conspire about how best to make the courtroom theater 
communicate a particular message to clients and others in the courtroom audience.‖ NOLAN, 
supra note 23, at 62. 
 40. See NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 18 (describing range of options). 
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between. Should the participant receive additional services? Is some 
intermediate sanction necessary? Should previously imposed 
restrictions be eased as a reward for progress toward treatment goals?  
Often, the judge plays a fairly subdued role in the team meetings, 
truly one among equals, and in some courts, such as Seattle‘s 
Municipal Mental Health Court, judges are not even present, leaving 
the other team members to develop the facts and, if possible, arrive at 
an agreed solution. As described later, achieving effectiveness within 
this consensus-seeking process while preserving fidelity to the client 
is perhaps the most significant challenge defenders face in this new 
milieu. The participants themselves are not allowed to appear at or 
observe the team meetings. In court, by contrast, the judge-participant 
dyad receives the spotlight,
41
 with the judge assuming whatever 
role—―confessor, task master, cheerleader, and mentor‖42—seems 
most likely to motivate that participant at that moment. This 
celebration of judicial engagement, energy, and flexibility
43
 suggests 
an imbalance in this central relationship of the problem-solving court, 
with the participant as a somewhat subordinate figure in his or her 
own life, driven by ―[t]he desire to please the judge or avoid the 
judge's disappointment or anger.‖44 Paradoxically, the centrality of 
the judge-participant relationship highlights the extent to which the 
efforts of problem-solving court judges (and all other court 
professionals) are dependent upon the participants, i.e., the clients, 
for validation. As drama replaces contest as the controlling courtroom 
metaphor, the grounds for evaluating the legal system, and the judges 
who prominently represent it, are changed. A traditional judge can 
approach (and retrospectively defend) a difficult decision based on its 
fidelity to precedent and/or the record of historical fact that was 
developed in court. By contrast, problem-solving justice, with its 
 
 41. See Stefan & Winick, supra note 22, at 521 (―The judge-participant interaction at 
these periodic hearings is an essential component of the court process.‖). 
 42. JEFFREY TAUBER, CAL. CTR. FOR JUD. EDUC. & RES., DRUG COURTS: A JUDICIAL 
MANUAL 5–6 (1994). 
 43. Stefan & Winick, supra note 22, at 521 (―The hearing becomes an exercise in creative 
problem solving in which the judge and other members of the treatment team attempt to resolve 
difficulties and overcome obstacles that have arisen in the treatment process.‖). 
 44. Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental Health 
Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 587, 597 (2005). 
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therapeutic and consumerist foundation, seeks affirmation in the 
future, in the form of participants‘ personal transformations. The 
ultimate measure of a judge‘s performance will lie in participants‘ 
collective response to the judge‘s combination of encouragement, 
inspiration, and sanctions.  
C. Lawyers in Problem-Solving Courts: Defining a Role 
1. Confusion 
Unlike judges, defense attorneys did not play a major role in 
creating the problem-solving court model, and they have struggled to 
define their place within it.
45
 In the courts that he observed, Nolan 
found defenders to be absent or ineffectual.
46
 A more recent case 
study of an Arizona drug court found that although prosecutors had 
opted for a reduced role, defense attorneys ranked among ―the most 
central players‖47 in the process. One New York drug court judge has 
described, with evident approval, seeing defense attorneys ―agreeing 
that maybe a few nights in jail would be just the thing to make sure 
that their client stays clean.‖48 Berman and Feinblatt, two of the most 
 
 45. Quinn, supra note 5, at 64. 
 46. NOLAN, supra note 23, at 40 (―[L]awyers generally play a less prominent role. In 
many drug courts the lawyers do not even show up for the regular drug court sessions, and even 
when they do, it is often difficult to determine just which persons in the courtroom are the 
attorneys.‖); id. at 51 (―[P]sychologists and other treatment providers play a dominant role in 
the drug court drama, often a role more pronounced than that of the attorneys.‖). 
 47. Salmon Adegboyega Shomade, Case Study of the Structures of Criminal and Drug 
Courts 220 (Oct. 9, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona), available at 
http://etd.library.arizona.edu/etd/GetFileServlet?file=file://data//pdf/etd/azu_etd_2381_1_m.pdf
&type=application/pdf. 
 48. Symposium, The Impact Of Problem Solving On The Lawyer’s Role And Ethics, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1892, 1893 (2002) [hereinafter Impact]. In this same passage, the judge 
offered observations of corresponding adjustments by prosecutors. Id.; see also Fisler, supra 
note 44, at 599 (―The public defenders learned that the District Attorney‘s Office was willing to 
take chances on individual defendants and not opt for easy convictions or punitive sentences if 
an assessment showed that appropriate treatment and supports could help a defendant live 
responsibly in the community.‖); BERMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 37 (referring to both 
defense and prosecution attorneys as members of a single class and asserting that ―[f]or drug-
court attorneys, the measure of success has become not whether they win or lose the case, but 
whether they are able to change the dysfunctional behavior of addicted offenders and reduce 
recidivism‖). This description, like that in the text accompanying supra note 44, relegates drug 
court participants to a subordinate role in which they are acted upon, monitored, motivated, or 
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prominent researchers in the field and strong supporters of problem-
solving courts, likewise explain how ―when a drug-court judge hands 
down a three-day jail sentence because an addict has failed to attend 
his treatment program, defenders are often surprisingly silent because 
they—and their clients—have already accepted the idea of 
intermediate jail sanctions as part of the treatment sentence.‖49  
Such silence need not be interpreted as abdication. A judge with 
experience in a problem-solving court has rejected the ―false 
dichotomy‖ between problem-solving justice and engaged defender 
advocacy.
50
 Even the New York judge quoted above describing 
attorneys agreeing to sanctions has exhorted defense counsel to 
remain vigilant: ―[L]awyers have to remember that they do not stop 
being advocates in problem-solving courts. In fact, quality lawyering 
matters, and it is crucial in these courts. . . . The challenge for defense 
lawyers is to take care that cooperation does not turn into capitulation 
. . . .‖51 A defense attorney told a panel exploring this subject, ―I do 
not believe that the role of the defense attorney has to change in a 
treatment court. I do not think that we have to be altered in our 
perception of what our role is. . . . I think it is more important that we 
speak for our client.‖52 Daniel Richman has attempted to mark the 
appropriate balance by advising defenders to ―strive to play the 
facilitative role necessary for therapeutic collaboration‖ while 
remaining ready to ―embrace [their] inner Lord Brougham.‖53 As 
described in the next section, this vision has not been well received in 
certain influential sectors of the defender community. 
 
even intimidated, rather than a position of agency, in which their decisions determine their own 
fate and the fate of the program. 
 49. Id. at 86. For an outraged response to such practices, see Morris B. Hoffman, A Neo-
Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567, 1567 (2003) 
(decrying ―the conspiracy of silence by the defense bar‖); Symposium, How Does the 
Community Feel About Problem-Solving Courts?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2041, 2057 (2002) 
(calling such practices a ―corruption of the constitutional role of the lawyer‖).  
 50. Symposium, The Judicial Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2011, 2021 (2002) 
(arguing it is incorrect to say ―that we can have an adversarial system or we can have thoughtful 
dispositions and outcomes, but we cannot have both‖). 
 51. Impact, supra note 48, at 1894. 
 52. Symposium, The Birth of a Problem-Solving Court, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1758, 
1775 (2002). 
 53. Daniel Richman, Professional Identity: Comment on Simon, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1609, 1614 (2003). 
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2. Resistance: A Battle over Lawyers‘ Place and Power 
Problem-solving court practice unsettles a powerful professional 
identity for defenders: that of the client‘s sole and resolute champion. 
This self-image has attracted many lawyers to and sustained
54
 them in 
their vocation as defenders of the accused. In the conventional model 
of criminal justice, client and attorney form a team of embattled 
underdogs confronting the power of the state. Joining the problem-
solving court team entails sharing goals, functions, and interactions 
with other team members, some of whom represent the institutions 
against which the defense has traditionally battled against.  
This Part examines three related strands of the opposition that 
defenders, including some clinicians,
55
 have raised in response to 
these changes: (1) the weakening of the lawyer-client relationship; 
(2) the erosion of attorney control over the client‘s information; and 
(3) the suppression of advocacy. The following Part demonstrates 
how defenders can preserve their traditional values, though not their 
rhetoric and strategies, within this new environment. 
 
 54. On the motivations driving public defenders, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 
(1993). William Simon has provocatively marked the distance between lawyers‘ 
professional/personal fulfillment in their role and the interest of clients in obtaining better 
results than those available in the traditional courts, remarking that ―[w]hether or not the 
defender is better off with the advent of the drug court, the lawyer‘s role remains to help [the 
client] make the choice that best serves his interests among the options open to him.‖ William 
H. Simon, Criminal Defenders and Community Justice: The Drug Court Example, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1595, 1599 (2003).  
 55. See Meekins, supra note 5, at 91 (arguing that problem-solving practices are ―at odds 
with the notion of zealous advocacy that underpins the widely understood role of defense 
lawyers‖); see also Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat 
Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 579 (2007) (―[D]efense counsel would do well to 
challenge the court‘s existence rather than merely advise clients that entering the court‘s 
program presents a risk.‖). Clinicians are certainly not alone in generating scathing critiques. 
See, e.g., Stefan & Winick, supra note 22, at 511. Stefan, a long-time advocate for the mentally 
ill, asserts that ―[t]he creation of mental health courts to solve the problems represented by 
people with psychiatric disabilities in the criminal justice system is similar to an unhappy 
teenager deciding to have a child to solve her problems.‖ Id. 
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a. The Fundamentals of Defense: Correct Posture 
In the role of champion, a defender seeks to erect a ―protective 
barrier‖56 between the client and all other actors. Effectiveness flows 
directly from exclusivity. No other actor—least of all the judge—has 
unmediated access to the client‘s thoughts. Aligned with the client, 
the defender‘s default posture is to stand against all others.57 The 
exclusivity of the lawyer-client relationship is the foundation for a 
distinctly powerful and often hard-won bond. Defenders often 
overcome a client‘s initial distrust by asserting and then 
demonstrating that the client is the only person the lawyer cares about 
and that the lawyer is the only person in the process wholly 
committed to the client.
58
 This passionate, unidirectional commitment 
has long emboldened defenders to remain steadfast against the 
powerful forces seeking to convict their clients. In an updated version 
of Lord Brougham‘s famous formulation, Florida attorney Barry Wax 
offered these reminiscences to the NACDL Task Force on Problem-
Solving Courts, ―When I was a young public defender that was the 
best job I ever had in my life. You know, you tried your cases and 
you knew that you could bring that court to a halt.‖59 One defender 
has described his mission in traditional courts as protecting clients 
from ―destructive justice.‖60 These comments reflect a vision, shared 
by many defenders, in which they stand outside the process, deriving 
satisfaction from the outlaw-by-proxy status they assume when they 
 
 56. Casey, supra note 5, at 1497. 
 57. Even in a conventional court, defenders cannot serve their clients adequately if they 
persist in an oppositional posture at all times. See Quinn, supra note 55, at 565 (―[G]ood 
criminal defense attorneys have long recognized their job calls for them to wear any number of 
hats throughout the course of a given case, not just that of trial lawyer or dogged adversary.‖). 
 58. The film CRIMINAL JUSTICE captures this quite well in a scene in which a public 
defender tells his client in the cellblock, ―Jessie, the only person I care about here is you. I don‘t 
[care about the victim, judge or DA.] They‘re not my . . . client.‖ CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Home 
Box Office 1990). 
 59. Miami, Florida Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. Even Jim Neuhard, 
a prominent advocate for the defender community who has demonstrated an openness to some 
aspects of problem-solving courts, worries about ―losing the ability to say the emperor has no 
clothes.‖ Panel Discussion, What does it Mean to be a Good Lawyer?: Prosecutors, Defenders 
and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 211 (2001).  
 60. Id. at 208–09. 
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stand up for those who are accused of crime. The opportunity to join 
the court team—becoming identified with and somewhat responsible 
for the process—is, from this perspective, an invitation to surrender, 
or at the very least, to forfeit something of great value. 
Timothy Casey, defender and clinician, decries the loss of 
exclusivity and primary responsibility for the client‘s fate when 
―problem-solving courts . . . remove the attorney from the process.‖61 
Defense attorneys are literally present,
62
 but they are no longer the 
distinctive protective and potentially disruptive force described 
above. Problem-solving court defendants must interact directly with a 
range of others who share responsibility for their success. Tamar 
Meekins, another defender-turned-clinical teacher, laments the 
devaluing of the attorney-client relationship that results when ―the 
non-legal team members may have greater interaction with, or 
develop a closer relationship to, the defendant than the defense 
attorney.‖63 Like Casey, Meekins sees defense counsel without ―a 
functional representational role‖64 in problem-solving courts. 
Meekins identifies an equally grave danger in the relationships that 
the defender, supplanted from primacy in the client‘s eyes, is likely to 
develop with other court actors: ―[T]he defender's ability to represent 
her client might be materially limited because of the lawyer's 
personal interest in maintaining professional relationships with other 
members of the team.‖65 
In theory, de-centering the defender-client relationship need not 
devalue it. However, both the rhetoric and the reality of the turn 
toward problem-solving courts provide ample grounds for defenders 
to feel targeted for elimination. Nolan quotes a drug court judge 
pejoratively referring to traditional, i.e., aggressive/protective, 
 
 61. Casey, supra note 5, at 1498. 
 62. Problem-solving courts that proceed without counsel are plainly illegitimate. 
However, this is a defect of implementation, not conception, akin to the well-documented 
history of ineffective, overworked, and too-often-absent defense counsel in traditional courts. 
See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT‘L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA‘S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14–17 (2009). 
 63. Meekins, supra note 5, at 91.  
 64. Id. at 92. 
 65. Id. at 106. 
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defenders‘ ―enabling complicity.‖66 A routine episode observed in 
Seattle Municipal Mental Health Court during the development of 
this Article
67
 demonstrates the risk of undesirable consequences from 
increasing the distance (and decreasing the identification) between 
defense attorney and client. A somewhat agitated defendant 
approached one of the two defenders assigned to the court, both from 
the same firm, and asked the lawyer to explain his rights to him. 
Seemingly unsatisfied with her response, he said he wanted to hire 
his own lawyer, something that all appearances suggested he lacked 
the means to accomplish. It appeared that his dissatisfaction with the 
process (and thus his representation) was due to the fact that no 
significant action on his case would occur that day because a required 
evaluation had not yet taken place (through no fault of his). Stating 
that the court was ―holding [him] hostage,‖ he alluded to plans to 
take up residence in another state, something he could not do while 
the case was pending. He said he would be willing to pay a fine to 
dispose of the case, as he did not think the fine for trying to steal 
chocolate milk (his offense, at least as he understood it) could be that 
much. Before the client had started raising such concerns, the 
defender had greeted him cheerfully, affirming that the reports from 
the probation officer about his program performance were positive. 
The defender seemed put out by the client‘s persistence in the face of 
the court‘s general positive feelings about him. With several other 
clients to attend to during the brief period between the pre-court team 
meetings and the call of the calendar, the lawyer perfunctorily stated 
that evaluations for individuals who are out of custody tend to take 
longer and sometimes result in continuances. The defender never 
addressed the client‘s interest in leaving the state or resolving the 
case in any other way and more or less turned things over to a social 
worker, who engaged the client more empathetically and also more 
directly. When the court called the case, the client remained silent, 
his body language and affect those of a man beaten down, rather than 
 
 66. NOLAN, supra note 23, at 81. Elsewhere, Nolan quotes a Department of Justice report 
stating that ―[t]raditional defense counsel functions and court procedures often reinforce the 
offender‘s denial of [a substance abuse] problem.‖ Id. at 49. 
 67. The events described took place on April 9, 2009. At all times described, I was seated 
in the public gallery of the courtroom, observing what any interested citizen might have seen.  
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built up, by the process that was supposedly helping him attain a new 
life. 
Of course, delays and caseload pressures plague most courts, often 
leading to friction between defendants and their lawyers, the buffer 
or, in Casey‘s term, ―barrier‖ between them and the system. The 
cautionary value of this account lies in its illustration of the manner 
in which problem-solving courts risk infantilizing participants, 
dispensing sympathetic encouragement rather than respectful 
engagement. To be clear, problem-solving court proponents have 
repeatedly emphasized that participation should be voluntary and 
fully informed.
68
 However, they have not afforded much attention to 
the ways in which daily routines might warp or dull the edges of their 
innovative approach, deadening the process and subduing participants 
with good intentions.
69
 
b. The Fundamentals of Defense: Voice 
Defenders have strenuously objected to the manner in which 
problem-solving courts reconfigure courtroom communication, with 
defendants speaking more and defenders much less.
70
 As described 
 
 68. However, the proponents may have overstated the possibility of a genuinely free 
choice, given the background of a conventional court system in which harsh punishments are 
the norm. See DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & AMANDA B. CISSNER, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
SEEING EYE TO EYE?: PARTICIPANT AND STAFF PERSPECTIVES ON DRUG COURTS 5 (2005) 
(―[P]articipants in all drug courts agreed that the primary factor behind the decision to enter 
drug court was to avoid incarceration.‖). The following excerpt from a focus group lays this 
bare: 
Moderator: Why did you enter the treatment court program? 
Participant 1: To stay out of prison. 
Participant 2: To avoid prison. 
Participant 3: It‘s pretty simple. 
Participant 4: Yeah, it‘s plain to me. 
Id. The authors state, ―Participants also felt that this decision is not completely voluntary. Drug 
court versus prison presents little real choice to most participants, with one commenting that ‗it 
was this [drug court] or jail so we just picked this.‘‖ Id. 
 69. See supra note 11. 
 70. See Meekins, supra note 5, at 123 (positing that ―[r]equiring the defendant to discuss 
the matter in open court may . . . discourage the development of the attorney-client 
relationship‖); Casey, supra note 5, at 1497 (suggesting that problem-solving courts‘ need for 
―unfiltered communication between defendants and the court‖ raises constitutional concerns). 
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above, the judge-participant colloquy is one of the defining features 
of problem-solving courts. In crucial respects, the formal content of 
the judge-participant exchange is almost irrelevant. The judge does 
not need to elicit details from the participant because someone from 
the multi-disciplinary court team (e.g., probation, social work, drug 
testing, or housing) likely already knows this information. Likewise, 
there is very little information the judge needs to deliver to the 
participant because frequent and regular contact with the team should 
ensure that the participant knows what is expected of him or her and 
what rewards or sanctions loom. Instead, the dialogue is part 
motivational speaking and part bonding-exercise. The judge 
demonstrates concern for the participant, support for his or her effort, 
and a commitment to continue monitoring, while also inculcating in 
the participant a sense of belonging and even obligation to the court 
community. 
Engaging in this dialogue with the judge may present certain risks 
to the participants (e.g., having to address highly emotional 
information related to their struggles with addiction, mental illness, 
or other difficult issues), but not the ones defenders are trained and 
conditioned to protect against by limiting client speech. In 
conventional hearings, the defender serves as the primary 
spokesperson,
71
 in part because, with the facts still undeveloped and 
the issue of guilt (or culpability) still unresolved, it is simply too 
dangerous to allow the client to speak freely. Judge Giselle Pollack, a 
supporter of problem-solving courts, described for the NACDL Task 
Force her difficulty allowing clients any freedom in this regard when 
she was a public defender: 
I had a hard time stepping away from the podium . . . because I 
wanted the ability to, you know, touch my client's hand if he 
started to talk about things, you know, and if he started to talk 
about more, I would get more assertive in that regard and that's 
why I was so close, because I was very protective.  
 That's the environment I grew up in. I grew up in an 
environment where more often than not my client would say 
 
 71. NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (―Defense counsel advocacy in the open 
courtroom defines that role and is essential to the attorney-client relationship.‖).  
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the most ridiculous things and they think they're helping 
themselves and would incriminate themselves all the 
time. . . .
72
 
Virtually the only times that defendants do speak in court in 
conventional hearings are when they testify at trial or speak on their 
own behalf at sentencing. Both of those presentations should be the 
result of careful preparation with counsel. Defenders have been slow 
to appreciate the extent to which the problem-solving court regime 
has recalibrated the stakes. As a public defender in a conventional 
court, Judge Pollack was rightly worried about any slip a client might 
make that would help the state establish the client‘s guilt at a future 
proceeding. In problem-solving court review hearings, guilt with 
respect to the underlying offense is not the issue, and there will rarely 
be genuine factual disputes over program compliance. Defenders 
should certainly be ready to contest any allegations a client denies. 
However, if the issue is a positive drug test, the participant has little 
to gain from denial and some chance to benefit from forthright 
acknowledgment.
73
 Meekins suggests that a participant ought not to 
be required to explain the circumstances surrounding program failure, 
such as illicit drug use, because the judge has the information needed 
to determine that a violation has occurred and impose sanctions.
74
 
This view is anchored in the dynamics of conventional courts, in 
which defendants, presumed innocent, benefit from inertia or stasis 
(i.e., ―What the court does not know can‘t hurt you.‖). This approach 
ill suits the problem-solving milieu, in which guilt has been 
acknowledged, progress is the goal, and the court aims to create a 
dynamic learning process through which all actors, i.e., judge, 
lawyers, providers, and, most of all, the participants, develop a 
deeper understanding of the participants‘ needs and weaknesses. As 
uncomfortable as defenders are with the idea of standing by while 
their clients speak unprotected and unfiltered, there is evidence that 
 
 72. Miami, Florida Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 100. 
 73. See id. at 226 (―If they‘re dirty, we ask them ‗Are you clean or dirty?‘ That means, 
‗Have you used? Will drugs be in your system?‘ If they tell us the truth, generally there may be 
a sanction, but a light sanction. If they lie to us, they will most probably end up in jail for two 
weeks for lying.‖). 
 74. See Meekins, supra note 5, at 123. 
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the participants themselves value this experience. Focus groups with 
drug court participants in New York showed that the interaction with 
the judge was extremely meaningful to them.
75
 
Just as they have sometimes failed to see the benefits that 
participation brings to clients, many defenders have been slow to see 
how the risks have been reduced, and even eliminated, because of the 
changed practices and perspectives of their erstwhile adversaries, the 
prosecutors. The NACDL Report and much of the anti-problem-
solving literature is haunted by the spectre of participants taking part 
in drug court because of an incidence of illicit drug use and then, in 
the course of a treatment review, admitting in open court a separate 
instance, rendering them vulnerable to prosecution for that as well. 
The NACDL Report appropriately calls for an explicit policy 
requiring prosecutors to forswear such practices.
76
 Adopting such a 
rule, however, would merely institutionalize long-standing practice, 
adopted by judges and prosecutors who recognized its necessity, 
largely without input from defenders. As one judge has described it, 
―So the statements come up, it's never a situation where defense says, 
‗Oh, my God, don't say that because the prosecutor is going to write 
that down and prosecute you.‘ That doesn't happen.‖77 Steeling 
 
 75. See FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 68, at 15 (―A consistent theme is that the 
courtroom experience is critical to participants.‖); id. at 16 (―Although appearing before the 
judge can be traumatic, participants also reported a sense of satisfaction when they received 
positive feedback.‖). 
 76. See NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 26. 
 77. Miami, Florida Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 266–67. Defenders 
themselves have reported the same. See id. at 98 (―I‘ve never seen any statements that have 
been used . . . by any counselors or anything that‘s happening in drug court been used in any 
prosecution.‖). But some continue to trumpet the danger, as became evident later in the Miami 
hearing: 
[QUESTIONER:] Is it the policy of the State Attorney‘s Office to in any way in a new 
crime for which the person is prosecuted to go back to the drug court people, issue 
subpoenas, try to find out information that can be used to impeach the defendant if he 
takes the witness stand in a new case? Do you ever do that? Has it ever happened? Do 
you know of any situation? 
MR. PAULUS: To my knowledge, it has never happened. . . . . 
But where they‘re kicked out on—whatever violation, very rarely does the prosecutor 
in drug court have any real communication with the prosecutor in the other court other 
than, ―We refer the case to you.‖ They don‘t share information. We don‘t talk about 
information. It doesn‘t really work like that. It‘s so treatment oriented. 
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themselves for battles they need not fight against enemies who have 
moved on,
78
 defenders risk marginalizing themselves and 
shortchanging clients. 
Addressing the subject of participant-judge dialogue, the NACDL 
Report asserts that ―judges should not ‗discount‘ the client‘s answer 
because it seemed prepared. Prepared comments demonstrate that a 
participant was concerned enough to take time to prepare for a 
hearing.‖79 If ―prepared‖ meant ―the product of careful reflection on 
one‘s behavior and its impact on one‘s goals and the concerns of 
others,‖ this recommendation would be compelling. In fact, the 
Author has seen instances of this in Seattle‘s Municipal Mental 
 
MR. CLARK: But it could? 
JUDGE ROSINEK: Well, it‘s a possibility the sun will not rise tomorrow. 
MR. SCHECHTER: It‘s not happening right now? 
MR. PAULUS: To my knowledge, it‘s never happened. 
JUDGE ROSINEK: There is nothing that prevents it. It‘s never happened. And if it 
happened, the credibility of the state attorney would be dissipated in my courtroom. I 
mean, we‘d have to change the entire policy if it happened once. It‘s never happened 
once. 
Id. at 270–71. 
 78. Addressing the related but slightly different issue of whether prosecutors in California 
had disingenuously altered their charging practices to blunt the impact of the state‘s treatment-
first initiative, one defender explained to the NACDL Task Force that his efforts had failed to 
produce any evidence of this bogeyman, a cousin of the urban legend of the prosecutor who 
takes advantage of the freely communicating drug court participant:  
Because I at one point sent out a department-wide e-mail and said, ―Look, give me the 
case—any case in which the D.A. has filed something that keeps the person from 
becoming eligible for Prop 36.‖  
 Well, they really couldn‘t give me any. It was more one of these anecdotal sort of 
creations.  
And if in fact the person really had a drug problem and just by the nature of the stop, 
the person had a nonqualifying crime, the D.A.s were actually dismissing stuff.  
 So we really weren‘t seeing somebody that was, you know, harshly attempting to 
keep people out of drug treatment. I think initially that was the fear, people rumored 
about the fear, but in reality we weren‘t finding that. 
. . . . 
And oftentimes, you know, we were finding in many instances that the D.A.s were in 
fact dismissing those cases or focusing on the drug treatment portion of it. 
San Francisco, California Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 18. 
 79. NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 37. 
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Health Court.
80
 During one review hearing, a participant recited a 
letter she had written to the judge to explain some personal traumas 
she had experienced, which she believed had contributed to setbacks 
in her program performance. The letter, plainly written without input 
from counsel, drew a respectful and warm response from the judge. 
However, to the extent that participants‘ ―prepared‖ remarks reflect 
painstaking consultation with risk-averse, ever-tactical counsel, a 
judicial discount seems the correct evaluation. The limited value of 
such statements can be seen from the formulaic responses one often 
sees in traditional courts when a defendant, in the course of entering a 
guilty plea, is asked to describe his conduct ―in his own words.‖ 
When lawyers are actively involved in ―preparing‖ such clients, these 
statements betray a syntax and vocabulary straight out of the relevant 
code section and unmistakably alien to the client‘s personal 
perspective. Such preparation lubricates the routine of traditional 
courts and insulates the clients from any errant remarks, but their 
sterility renders them useless in a problem-solving court, an 
environment designed to stimulate growth. 
C. Resolution: Lower Volume, Greater Influence 
Deprived of the galvanizing contests that mark the days of a trial 
lawyer, defenders in problem-solving courts nevertheless perform 
distinctive and vital tasks. Their work begins with the defendant‘s 
decision to enter a problem-solving court program. This threshold 
moment has its obvious therapeutic implications, but a lawyer‘s 
priorities at this point ought to be fairly conventional, i.e., ensuring 
that defendants receive full information, candid advice, and time to 
make a considered decision.
81
 Wexler suggests that defendants be 
 
 80. April 27, 2009. Notes on file with author. 
 81. LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 24. Jeffrey Tauber, a judge and a leading 
promoter of problem-solving courts, agrees with this premise. Impact, supra note 48, at 1904 
(―Certainly before someone enters a problem-solving court or at the time someone leaves a 
problem-solving court, there is a very important place for adversariness.‖). This recognition 
belies the characterization of the ―difficult dilemma‖ facing a hypothetical lawyer who must 
counsel a client about entering a drug court while believing ―that there is a high probability that 
the charges will be dismissed because of procedural irregularities in the arrest.‖ Mary 
Berkheiser, Frasier Meets CLEA: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School Clinics, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 1147, 1169 (1999). This is no dilemma. Counsel may discuss with 
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allowed, even encouraged, to watch problem-solving court 
proceedings and even visit service providers before making their 
decision. Wexler imagines that ―[a] lawyer, or paralegal, might play 
an important role in maximizing the vicarious learning by sitting 
through the session and explaining to the . . . client exactly what is 
happening.‖82 These tasks are not as dramatic as cross-examining a 
witness or delivering a closing argument, but they can be quite 
challenging, especially for defenders in transition to the new role. 
The defender must be capable of representing the process to the client 
without unduly promoting the court or cynically tearing it down. 
Counsel should likewise assume a traditional posture when a client is 
facing termination from a problem-solving court. At that moment, the 
court has ceased working to solve the client‘s underlying problem 
and is deciding merely the amount of sanctions to impose once and 
for all. At all points between entry and exit (successful or otherwise), 
the defender must continue the effort to maintain balance and clarity, 
as described by Jane Spinak, a clinician and defender with 
considerable experience with alternative courts: 
A more nuanced role is required of the defender, combining, at 
a minimum, her understanding of the individual client, the 
client's legal status, the effectiveness of the client's treatment, 
and the multiple messages the other participants are sending, 
so that each time the defender can determine, with the client, 
the appropriate response.
83
 
Spinak‘s call for sensitivity to ―multiple messages‖ aligns with Dorf 
and Fagan‘s description of the ―web of reciprocal accountability‖84 in 
 
the client the option of obtaining treatment through the court, with the possibility of sanctions 
always lurking in the background, but must clearly and accurately present the option of seeking 
to suppress the evidence and obtaining treatment another way. For an example of a client opting 
for (and succeeding in) treatment despite a claim of innocence throughout, see Schreibersdorf, 
supra note 5, at 405–06. For evidence of the consensus on the importance of traditional defense 
representation at the time of potential discharge, see Casey, supra note 5, at 1515–16; NACDL 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 28; Tuscon, Arizona Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 18. 
 82. Wexler, supra note 5, at 752. 
 83. Jane M. Spinak, Why Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender’s Role in Problem-
Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (2003). 
 84. Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to 
Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2003). 
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problem-solving courts. Both analyses emphasize the multiplicity of 
relationships that each actor in the process must establish and nurture. 
They also point to a new conception of advocacy for which the 
modern, networked generation of law students should be well suited. 
Defenders in traditional courts have asked little of other actors but the 
freedom to do their work. A map of their relations to others would 
show them on the periphery (the better to avoid being outflanked), 
but close to the client, with a single thick, dark line reflecting the 
intensity of the connection between them. The other actors in the 
system would be a good distance away. There is room in a web-like, 
diffusely networked community
85
 for a distinctive relationship 
between lawyer and client, but both must move closer to and develop 
meaningful relationships with the other participants. Each member in 
the network must be capable of sending messages to and receiving 
messages from each of the others. This is quite different from the 
highly centralized network observed in conventional courts, in which 
all messages are ultimately directed to the judge and generally sent 
through and by counsel.  
The problem-solving court community is intended to work 
constructively rather than competitively. Relationships between any 
two members (e.g., those between judge and participant or defense 
counsel and probation officer) need not interfere with or detract from 
other relationships (e.g., that between defense counsel and client). 
Instead, the multiple ties reinforce each other. The defense lawyer is 
better able to communicate with and advocate for the client because 
of her rapport with other community members, and the client is better 
able to take advantage of the lawyer‘s advice because of reduced 
dependence upon it. Unlike representation in a trial paradigm, where 
everything hinges on a single contest, representation in a problem-
solving court is a continuous campaign, requiring coordination—and 
far more sharing of responsibility—between lawyer and client. Even 
more important than their increased in-court speaking role, clients 
embody their case directly through interactions outside of counsel‘s 
presence, let alone control. Nevertheless, counsel has a vital role to 
play in helping the client prepare for these interactions. Just as 
 
 85. See Shomade, supra note 47. 
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lawyers traditionally prepare a client to testify, they can also role-
play meetings with treatment court actors. These sessions are more 
difficult to simulate than virtually any cross-examination because 
they are not governed by a well-defined set of rules in the way that 
evidentiary hearings are. Defender offices, perhaps assisted by law 
clinics, might need to develop protocols with non-lawyer 
professionals from other disciplines in order to provide their clients 
with the greatest chance for success.  
This preparatory role-playing is only superficially similar to 
preparing a client to testify or otherwise appear in court. Trial 
lawyers are taught that a first impression can be the difference 
between winning and losing.
86
 In problem-solving courts, however, 
where participants will have repeated and extended exposure to the 
judge and other influential actors, a good first impression is merely a 
nice start. It will be of little long-term benefit if the client is not able 
to achieve and maintain the substantial and long-term behavior 
change that is the court‘s objective.87 Defense counsel‘s ability to 
attain a distinctive ―understanding of the individual client,‖ to use 
Spinak‘s phrase,88 can prove highly valuable in keeping the client on 
track and keeping other court actors invested in the client‘s success. 
This is a less triumphal vision than that of a Brougham-esque 
champion, but it is neither less important nor less difficult.  
Two examples, one hypothetical and another based on an 
observation of mental health court proceedings, illustrate the 
complexity and centrality of counsel‘s distinctive advocacy role in 
problem-solving courts. In his discussion of the scope of due process 
protections in problem-solving courts, Eric Lane offers the example 
of a drug court judge faced with a request by defense counsel to 
allow a client to enter an outpatient treatment program following 
 
 86. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS & PRACTICE 309 
(student ed. 2010) (―The attorney who is successful in seizing the opening moment will have an 
advantage throughout the trial . . . .‖).  
 87. The motivational interviewing skills which Winick emphasizes are likely to prove 
essential to this long-term process. Winick, supra note 5, at 1080–81.  
 88. Spinak, supra note 83, at 1621. For discussions of the way an attorney can make sense 
of her understanding of the client, see David F. Chavkin, Spinning Straw Into Gold: Exploring 
the Legacy of Bellow and Moulton, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 251 n.28 (2003); Kimberly A. 
Thomas, Sentencing: Where Case Theory and the Client Meet, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 187 
(2008). 
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three months of successful participation in inpatient treatment.
89
 After 
consulting with the court‘s clinical director, outside of court but with 
notice to counsel, the judge denies the request. Lane‘s account of the 
hypothetical director‘s statement that ―90% of those defendants who 
are able to successfully complete the first phase of the court‘s 
treatment component—remaining clean for four months—have either 
successfully graduated from the program or are still active in 
treatment after two years‖ will likely ring true to drug court 
veterans.
90
 Even though this judge is relying on more data than would 
typically be available when making detention decisions in a 
conventional court, such information should be an opening, not an 
end, to the discussion. Counsel ought to have the opportunity to 
explore with the director and the judge the methods by which the data 
were collected and analyzed, the characteristics of the populations 
involved, and any salient features that might indicate a different 
course for a specific individual participant. Limited statistical 
expertise poses a far greater danger than the corruption which 
Meekins warns against.
91
 Rigorous scrutiny of such extrapolation is 
essential because, unlike a judge‘s trial rulings in conventional 
courts, very little of what judges decide in problem-solving courts is 
subject to appellate review.  
Moreover, such scrutiny is consistent with the ―revisability in 
light of experience‖92 that problem-solving court practitioners ask of 
participants and should demand of themselves. Defenders can 
preserve their vocation‘s tradition of vigilance and challenge by 
holding problem-solving court decision makers to their promise of a 
learning environment in which the client‘s success is the primary 
objective. The capacity for data analysis and policy critique may be 
one of the most valuable resources law school clinics can bring to the 
problem-solving court arena.  
As always, the value of defenders‘ activities must be measured in 
terms of its impact on clients. Meaningful review of court protocols 
 
 89. Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 
967–68 (2003). 
 90. Id. at 968. 
 91. See Meekins, supra note 5, at 123. 
 92. Dorf, supra note 22, at 940. 
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enables defenders to provide valuable advice to clients (e.g., ―You 
know, we have really pushed them on this and it turns out that most 
folks do better with the transition if they have completed four months 
in this phase. I know you think you‘re ready to move on now, and I 
can raise it with the judge, but I can‘t think of anything that would 
qualify you as the kind of exceptional case that would make it a 
strong argument.‖). On the other hand, advice tainted by the world-
weariness common in conventional courts (e.g., ―This judge wants 
his four months in. There‘s just not much we can do about it.‖) is 
likely to have an adverse impact on a client, alienating him or her 
from the process and reducing the chance of success. A similar 
conversation about a suppression hearing in a conventional court 
(e.g., ―This judge tends to cut officers a lot of slack.‖) may likewise 
reduce a client‘s respect for the judiciary, but it will not impede the 
client‘s chances because the client‘s ongoing behavior is not at issue 
in such proceedings. Both the client and the defender are likely to 
reap the benefits that accrue from the judge‘s recognition that they 
are both sufficiently invested in the rules of the program that they 
avoid conflict when it is not truly indicated. 
Embracing their educative function, attorneys can play a vital role 
in developing clients‘ effectiveness as advocates in court as well. In 
his call for defenders to adopt a more therapeutic orientation to their 
practice in all settings, Wexler suggests that lawyers might ―create a 
‗bank‘ of videotapes of victim statements, and ultimately suggest that 
a client, in preparing a written apology letter (or videotape), include a 
section where he or she imagines the many ways in which the crime 
likely affected the victim's life.‖93 Given the nature of the offenses in 
question, victim impact, in its narrowest sense, generally plays a 
lesser role in drug and mental-health courts than it does in other 
courts. Possessory drug offenses are victimless crimes, and many of 
the cases on the dockets of mental health courts do not involve grave 
harm to victims.
94
 However, drug addiction and its attendant behavior 
often results in great harm to others, especially family members. 
 
 93. Wexler, supra note 5, at 755. 
 94. The chocolate milk theft example cited earlier is not atypical in mental health court, 
something that has, understandably, produced concern about the net-widening effect of such 
courts. See NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 42. 
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Loved ones likewise often bear considerable burdens because of the 
acts of the untreated mentally ill. By helping clients articulate their 
awareness of this aspect of their experience, defenders can positively 
influence the clients‘ performance during their colloquies with the 
judge. Because these subjects are so highly charged with emotion and 
the clients are so vulnerable, Quinn‘s concern about the dangers 
involved must not be forgotten. However, the fact that an attorney 
might not possess the competence to perform this function alone does 
not mean she cannot facilitate the process, drawing on the support the 
network promises the client.  
A case observed in mental health court provided a quite different 
example of how defender membership and participation in a 
networked court community can produce results similar to those 
obtained through conventional advocacy. A defendant came to court 
having previously been placed on Electronic Home Monitoring 
(EHM) because of violations earlier in the case. The defendant had 
done quite well on EHM, complying with its requirements and 
advancing toward his treatment goals. At the hearing, the probation 
officer reported on this performance and also informed the court that 
the defendant wished to be released from EHM. The probation officer 
reluctantly supported this request, reenacting aloud his internal 
deliberations. He made the cases for and against the move (a reward 
for positive performance versus the risk that removing the structure 
that had promoted change would invite a return of earlier 
difficulties). This soliloquy accurately represented the arguments that 
defense counsel and the prosecutor would likely have made in a 
traditional court. The probation officer‘s ability to encapsulate the 
traditionally competing perspectives reflected the success of the court 
team in forming a cohesive unit that respects and appreciates the 
legitimacy of often-clashing interests implicated in the criminal 
justice system. Asked if he had informally lobbied the probation 
officer before the hearing, defense counsel said he had not. In 
context, this was not an abandonment of his duty as an advocate but 
rather a proper judgment about the operation of the network in which 
he operates daily. Confident of his connection to the probation 
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officer,
95
 he could watch silently as the process unfolded, with the 
result that his client benefited because the recommendation came 
from the court‘s own staff rather than the client‘s partisan 
representative.
96
 Experienced lawyers make similar judgments in the 
context of litigation all the time, placing their clients‘ fate in the 
hands of someone they trust will do what they and the client wish.
97
  
Neither the principal performers nor even the orchestrators of the 
performances of others, defenders in problem-solving courts are a 
connective force, bolstering clients‘ ability to advocate for 
themselves and ensuring that clients‘ efforts are properly supported 
and appreciated by others. Ironically, the one stage in the process 
where defenders are most likely to perform traditional advocacy is 
the team meeting, the most distinctive, and often most important, part 
 
 95. Impact, supra note 48, at 1904 (―[P]erhaps one of our strongest, if not our strongest, 
suits . . . is the capacity of the people who work around the problem-solving court to become a 
team, to really see the issue together—not necessarily see the solution together, but see the issue 
together and see the need for a solution, and then to work together from their various 
perspectives to make that solution a reality.‖); see also Tucson, Arizona Hearing, NACDL 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 195–96. Tammy Wray stated: 
I know, I‘ve been working with these probation officers for years, and I respect them, 
and I count them as my friends.  
In fact, I work with more probation officers than I do attorneys. And so in that respect, 
the good part of that, is that when, that I have a better rapport with them, and they 
know me, and I can go to them and say listen, we‘re having this issue with this client, 
what can we do? How can we handle it?  
They‘re more likely to listen to me than they would be to listen to an attorney that they 
didn‘t know, or than a standard probation officer would. 
Id. 
 96. Certainly, counsel retained the ability to address the court if probation had not done 
so, but even more than in traditional courts, the likelihood of success in overriding a probation 
officer‘s recommendation is exceedingly slim in problem-solving courts. NOLAN, supra note 
23, at 151 (referring to judicial deference to treatment staff). 
 97. See San Francisco, California Hearings, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 1.  
I mean, and those of us that have worked in front of really good judges, you know 
what that means. I mean, you can do an open plea with a judge, and everybody says, 
―Are you crazy?‖ And you say, ―No, I am not crazy because I know this judge will do 
the right thing.‖  
And so it‘s that dynamic that works in the criminal justice system works best in adult 
drug court. 
Id. 
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of the problem-solving court process.
98
 Without the client at her side, 
the attorney must integrate the new information provided by other 
team members into her ongoing ―understanding of the individual 
client‖ and then devise a response that advances the client‘s interests. 
In court, counsel can relate any additional pertinent information 
obtained from the client after the staffing, but the general 
commitment to the team process cloaks the recommendation with an 
authority and momentum that can be hard to unravel. Accordingly, 
counsel‘s ―understanding of the individual client‖ must be 
sufficiently strong as to make the client a real presence at the 
lawyer‘s side, enabling the lawyer to assess the various reports 
through the client‘s eyes. Counsel will need to engage in the sort of 
creative, yet grounded, narrative thinking that marks the finest trial 
lawyers, even though they will likely remain seated at the table and 
speak in a very different register from that which would characterize 
a trial opening or closing.  
Convincingly summoning the client‘s fictional presence into the 
staffing ensures integrity as well as creativity. Addressing attorneys 
representing children in child-welfare proceedings, Jean Koh Peters 
has advised, ―[N]ever act or make statements outside the presence of 
your client that you would not make in front of your client.‖99 Peters 
writes that it is necessary to make this command explicit because 
―children often do not attend critical events at which legal issues are 
decided on their behalf.‖100 Problem-solving court staffings are 
critical, and participants are entitled to have counsel present, 
 
 98. See id. at 173. Jeffrey Thoma stated: 
[A]nd what you are able to do at the staffing is bring everything to bear. If that person 
gets a dirty test yet you want to bring in, okay, but, look, they just got their GED, and 
they were celebrating or whatever. Look what they have done. Look at the last six 
months, and look at the job they have done and everything, and you try to bring 
whatever positive you can, and that‘s what the staffing is all about. 
Id. 
 99. JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: 
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 132 (3d ed. 2007). Peters‘ work anticipates some of the 
other critical challenges in problem-solving court lawyering. Her command to ―Cultivate Right 
Relationships with Other People in the Child‘s World‖ aligns directly with the discussion, 
supra, regarding how attorneys can be effective within the network of relationships in a 
problem-solving court community. Id. at 134. 
 100. Id. at 132. 
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engaged, and singularly committed to their success. In important 
respects, Peters‘ dictum might be edited to say that counsel should 
―never act (or fail to act) differently because the client is absent.‖ 
Because there is no record of these meetings nor any outside 
observation, the risks of co-optation that problem-solving court 
opponents have raised are likely greatest at this juncture. 
This Part has attempted to illustrate the ways in which 
representing clients in problem-solving courts presents defenders 
with challenges that are as urgent, rich, and potentially fulfilling as 
those that defenders have long embraced in the traditional trial court 
setting. The forms that representation takes are often, but not always, 
different, but the core commitment to the client‘s chosen path toward 
success remains the same. Those who have succeeded in making this 
adjustment have recognized the scale of the challenge and the level of 
professional expertise required. Judge Kluger remarked, ―I think 
some of the institutional public defenders make a serious mistake 
when they assign their least-experienced, and sometimes their least-
able, lawyers to these courts.‖101 
Howard Finkelstein, a Florida public defender, made similar 
statements: 
 [M]ost offices usually have their less skilled lawyers 
handling drugs and mental health stuff. We have some of our 
best lawyers, most experienced lawyers in here for that exact 
reason, because I know there is this slippery slope and I need 
lawyers in there who at least, hopefully, will know when it‘s 
time to walk across the line and sing Cumbaya and when it‘s 
time to stay on this side of the line and throw the gauntlet 
down.
102
 
. . . . 
. . . I don‘t have my baby lawyers in there. [The defender 
assigned to this mental-health court], 30 years he‘s been a 
public defender doing nothing else but mental health.  
 
 101. Impact, supra note 48, at 1894. 
 102. Miami, Florida Hearing, NACDL Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. 
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 So I‘ve taken one of my best, most experienced, highest 
paid people and I‘ve put him in there . . . .103 
Part II of this Article will address the challenges of introducing clinic 
students, ―baby lawyers,‖ into this world in which the expectations 
for lawyers are still being clarified and the judgment demanded of 
them is highly refined. 
II. CLINICAL THEORY IN PROBLEM-SOLVING PRACTICE 
Clinical educators have the opportunity to play a leading role in 
shaping the way that problem-solving justice enters and influences 
law school curricula.
104
 The clinical method and the problem-solving 
model share a common spirit of pragmatic inquiry. Addressing ―how 
we can use innovative practices in the fields to play back on legal 
education,‖105 commentator Derek Denckla suggests that ―the 
problem-solving court‘s model tries to author a different notion of 
lawyering where the notion of the case should be expanded.‖106 Many 
clinicians would affirm Denckla‘s commitment to innovation, as well 
as the imperative of drawing pedagogical inspiration from practice 
and the need to redefine how lawyers wield their professional skill 
and authority. Equally important, problem-solving justice and clinical 
education also share a commitment to ―revisability in light of 
experience.‖107 Problem-solving courts are designed to ―use data to 
make more informed decisions about where to target resources and 
how to craft effective sanctions.‖108 Donald Schön, an influential 
 
 103. Id. at 188. 
 104. To date, the literature reflects some carefully considered but highly limited 
experiments with problem-solving or therapeutic practice. See Gregory Baker & Jennifer 
Zawid, The Birth of a Therapeutic Courts Externship Program: Hard Labor But Worth the 
Effort, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 722 (2005); Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: Meeting the Challenge of the New ABA 
Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 429 (2005). Each of the courses described in these articles 
offers students an opportunity for structured experiential learning within a problem-solving or 
therapeutic milieu, but neither places students in a position of responsibility for clients, an 
essential component of clinical education, as described within. 
 105. Symposium, Alternative Approaches to Problem Solving, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1981, 1995 (2002). 
 106. Id. at 1997. 
 107. Dorf, supra note 22, at 940. 
 108. See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 33. 
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scholar on the subject of professional expertise and learning, warned 
that clinical legal education was unlikely to be successful if its 
precepts were not measured against experience for their accuracy.
109
 
This Part of the Article will explore both the affinity and the tension 
between problem-solving practice and clinical education,
110
 
ultimately sketching an understanding of how the two approaches can 
be aligned to the maximum benefit of students, the clients they serve, 
and the legal system in which they practice. 
A. Learning (Through) Responsibility and Relationships 
Responsibility toward a client is what most clearly distinguishes a 
law student‘s clinical experience from the rest of law school.111 This 
responsibility can engender a disorienting lack of control.
112
 The 
 
 109. Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 
231, 243 (1995). 
 110. The field of modern clinical education is vast, encompassing the representation of 
individual clients in high-volume courts and administrative agencies as well as legislative 
advocacy, international human rights reporting, and even appearances in the United States 
Supreme Court. This section of the Article will focus on several common features of clinical 
teaching that transcend many of the distinctions within the field. 
 111. See Jane H. Aiken et al., The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REV. 
1047, 1053 (1985) (―Our primary objective is an ambitious one: to help law students learn to 
accept responsibility. . . . [Supervisors‘ commitment to student responsibility includes] 
permitting them to make case decisions entirely at odds with those that we would make if we 
were counsel for the client.‖); Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About 
Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 270 (1998) (―Students continually 
assume direct responsibility for weighing choices and planning courses of action in problematic 
circumstances.‖); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1663 (1991) (―[A]ctively taking responsibility 
contributes to the development of responsible character to a greater extent than any other 
approach.‖). 
 112. For an illustration of the importance of a sense of control to clinic students, see Robert 
Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Student’s Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal 
Defendants, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 299, 302 (1994) (―I had a terrible time. I found the work more 
than difficult; I found it excruciating. I was anxious all the time. I felt insecure. I felt out of 
control. I could not relax. In short, I was not having fun.‖); id. at 307 (listing ―Lack of Control‖ 
as the first of three ―themes‖ influencing the author‘s negative reaction to his clinic experience); 
Jennifer Howard, Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Through Experience, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 
167, 182 (1995) (―This lack of control is multiplied for a student-lawyer. Completion of tasks 
becomes the only way we feel a sense of control, and thereby relieve some of the anxiety that 
we develop.‖). The title of Fran Quigley‘s article, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult 
Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 
37 (1995), aptly captures this aspect of the clinical experience.  
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grave needs of clients with serious mental illness, such as those in 
problem-solving mental health courts, might understandably be seen 
as exacerbating the feeling of absence of control.
113
 In my 
observations of mental health court, I have witnessed defendants 
decompensating in ways that made me uncomfortable even though I 
was a mere observer and I have nearly two decades of professional 
experience, including the representation of many clients with mental 
illnesses. Students, feeling the weight of their inexperience, will 
almost certainly wrestle with even greater anxiety at such moments. 
However, the design and ethos of mental health courts reduce the 
burdens on defense counsel (and thus clinic students) in such 
situations. When clients experience a crisis related to their condition, 
they are not violating a behavioral norm—as it would seem in a 
conventional court—but instead are exhibiting the need for support 
and services that brought them to this court in the first place.
114
 
Because such an episode does not jeopardize the client‘s long-term 
prospects, clinic students, as defenders, should feel no need to 
improvise a miraculous solution.
115
  
Clinical teachers can guide students toward effectiveness in 
problem-solving courts through the creative adaptation of several 
core concepts within the clinical lawyering literature. Chief among 
these theoretical resources is the focus on the lawyer-client 
relationship as the central subject within the clinic experience.
116
 
 
 113. See Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 971, 978–79 (1991–92). Dinerstein describes the experience of a clinic representing a 
defendant with mental illness in a conventional criminal proceeding: 
Then all hell broke loose. . . . Mrs. Smith suddenly interrupted the colloquy and began 
to complain that the complainants . . . were continuing to bother her and that the 
conviction was unfair. She grew increasingly agitated, yelling ―Excuse me, excuse 
me,‖ whenever the judge tried to get a word in. Though we tried, there was little we 
could do to control her. 
Id. Dinerstein‘s account stands as an early—and more powerful because incidental—indictment 
of conventional courts as tribunals incapable of addressing the needs of people with mental 
illness.  
 114. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Dinerstein, supra note 113, at 979 (describing how a student‘s attempt to persuade 
the judge not to detain a client in midst of mental health crisis backfired, with the result that the 
judge not only detained the client but also ordered a child protective services investigation). 
 116. Robert Dinerstein et al., Legal Interviewing and Counseling: An Introduction, 10 
CLINICAL L. REV. 281, 289 (2003) (―Most of the time that lawyers spend and the intellectual 
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Client-centeredness, perhaps the core tenet of modern clinical 
education,
117
 has a distinctive potential meaning and impact in 
problem-solving practice. In ways that are unusual, if not quite 
unique, the proceedings are about the client. The court‘s primary 
focus is the client‘s current progress. By and large, neither the 
historical facts of the criminal incident nor any complex legal 
analysis will be critical to the outcome of the proceedings. Instead, 
lawyers must develop an ―understanding of the individual client.‖ To 
achieve this, a lawyer must encourage the client to share her vision 
for life beyond the court, what Kate Kruse has referred to as the 
―project of ‗becoming‘ the kind of person the client wants to be.‖118 
Valuable in any representation, the extra effort to understand the 
―kind of person the client wants to be‖ is especially important in 
problem-solving courts because the conditions that bring clients into 
such courts (e.g., addiction, mental illness) will often divert them 
from (and lead them to lose sight of) their goals.
119
 In addition, as 
 
energy that they bring to their work is not devoted to events in a tribunal, whether it be a trial or 
appellate court, an administrative agency or before some other decision-making authority. 
Much of lawyers‘ work and talents are devoted to the development of a relationship with their 
client.‖); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality 
and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1996); Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A 
Model of Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV. 161, 190 (2002) (referring to ―the last 
foundational element of modern lawyering theory: the centrality of the lawyer-client 
relationship‖). 
 117. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED 
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). Cataloging the citations in the clinical literature to this work in its 
two editions would be an immense undertaking. The following short list of citations to works 
with the phrase ―client-centered‖ in the title shows the early and continuing influence of the 
authors‘ approach to thinking about lawyering: V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who’s 
Listening? Introducing Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary 
Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83 (2002); Dina Francesca Haynes, 
Client-Centered Human Rights Advocacy, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 379 (2006); John B. Mitchell, 
Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What is a True Believer to do When His Two 
Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85 (1999); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It, 
Anyway?—Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 
CLINICAL L. REV. 509 (2008); Linda F. Smith, Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison 
of the “Traditional” Interview and the “Client-Centered” Interview, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 
(1995). 
 118. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 411 n.190 (2006); see also Robert D. Dinerstein, 
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); 
Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered 
Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997). 
 119. In the context of outpatient commitments of individuals with mental illness, Winick 
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noted in Part I, some preliminary research has shown that participants 
enter problem-solving court more from the desire to avoid 
incarceration than from a settled pursuit of any particular goal.
120
 A 
lawyer‘s effort to understand the client‘s aspirations can make the 
difference between failure and success for the lawyer and the client. 
Problem-solving court practice also provides an excellent setting 
for examining the extent to which lawyers‘ relationships with their 
clients are aligned with the other important relationships in the 
clients‘ lives. As a team of experienced clinicians have observed, 
―[c]lients . . . have families and communities to which they are 
connected. . . . These connections . . . will in turn affect the kind of 
connections that lawyers make with their clients.‖121 Many clients in 
mental health court have become separated or even isolated from 
their support systems, often because of their untreated illness and its 
effects on their behavior.
122
 Families that remain actively involved 
with and supportive of their struggling relatives confront their limited 
ability to achieve a significant impact in helping the participants to 
overcome the burdens of their conditions. The court and its team fill 
this gap in the client‘s life, providing meaningful connections that 
must become an essential unit of lawyer‘s study and strategy.  
As described in Part I, the team meeting is the pivotal event in 
problem-solving courts. Clinical teachers in such courts can (and 
must) use their supervisory role to help students see possibilities for 
meaningful action that might not be apparent at first glance to novice 
professionals equally excited and overwhelmed
123
 by the prospect of 
 
proposes the idea of advance directives, acknowledging that they present ―a number of legal, 
ethical, clinical, and logistical challenges.‖ Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 107, 129 (2003). During 
their periods of stability and insight, often achieved through the engagement of effective 
treatment, such individuals would be permitted to establish the ground rules for how they wish 
to be treated in the event that they end up lacking in insight, whether due to their failure to 
comply or merely the overwhelming nature of their condition. Id. 
 120. See supra note 68. 
 121. Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 756–57 (2004). 
 122. My observation of mental health court proceedings produced this impression, which I 
confirmed in conversation with one of the experienced defense attorneys assigned to the court. 
Needless to say, this speculation is ripe for more systematic verification. 
 123. See Goldfarb, supra note 111, at 1652 (describing students‘ experience of ―a jumble 
of impressions, sensations, feelings, intuitions, and actions‖). 
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representing clients. In many clinic settings, students can develop the 
bond with the client through a series of meetings designed to develop 
the facts underlying the case. Although students often have many 
collateral sources for exploring such facts, the process of seeking the 
client‘s input validates the client‘s importance to the case and 
establishes the foundation of the relationship. This process furthers 
the students‘ professional development as well because it forces them 
to practice the habits of refraining from premature conclusions and 
simultaneously holding generous and critical interpretations of 
ambiguous client disclosures.
124
 This model of relationship-building 
is not wholly compatible with the problem-solving court routine. 
With a schedule full of meetings with court-related personnel, a client 
will perceive little added benefit from reporting to her student-lawyer 
what she has likely already reported to the other court team members 
she sees during the week. Moreover, the inquiry will not only rankle 
as redundant, it may create the impression that the student-lawyer is 
peripheral to the court‘s process (―If you were really plugged in, you 
would know all this.‖). Although not interacting with the other team 
members as often as the client, the student-lawyer does have a seat at 
the team meeting, something the client does not. Students can use 
that as the basis for a distinctive and productive conversation with the 
client, inviting the client to share her thoughts about her relations 
with the other team members and her feelings about the court process 
as a whole. Such an inquiry validates the client as a key contributor to 
the representation and enables the student to pivot into a 
demonstration of her capacity to ensure that the meeting is governed 
by a genuine respect for the client‘s experience.125  
The student must use her independent appreciation of the team 
dynamics to affirm and, where necessary, challenge the client‘s 
assessment. Demonstrating her own assessment of how different 
team members will act in the meeting,
126
 the student can prepare the 
 
 124. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 
8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).  
 125. The failure to communicate to clients the manner in which the lawyer will be working 
for the client at the meeting may explain, at least to some degree, why participants often remain 
ignorant of their lawyer‘s advocacy role. See FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 68, at 10–11. 
 126. Aaronson, supra note 111, at 278 (noting the importance of lawyers‘ ability to 
―project themselves imaginatively into the place of others‖). 
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client for the likely result of the meeting while also demonstrating 
how she stands apart, if only slightly, from the rest of the team. The 
students‘ ability to credibly portray the team members, whom the 
client knows well, tests a student‘s empathy (for client and team 
member) and his or her performance skills. Effective performances of 
this type, every bit as difficult as litigation,
127
 could make some 
difficult conversations bearable for the client, thus putting in motion 
a virtuous cycle in which understanding replaces resistance and sets 
the stage for success. 
The effort described here to fathom and refine the client‘s 
appreciation of his or her place within the court community embodies 
the commitment of clinical teachers to help students develop the 
ability ―to think flexibly and creatively about how to approach the 
variety of interactions that can occur within the lawyer-client 
relationship, rather than unreflectively reverting to a standardized 
vision of the relationship that makes other interactions seem 
deviant.‖128 This is a valuable contribution that clinics can make to 
courts that are peculiarly vulnerable to the risks of standardization 
present in any high-volume justice system.
129
 Problem-solving courts‘ 
distinctive remedy is intended for a specific set of problems. The 
process of classifying defendants as eligible for treatment results in a 
label that may suppress the idiosyncratic aspects of any individual 
participant‘s experience. Lawyers in problem-solving courts must be 
committed to preserving the client‘s individuality, preventing the 
process from lapsing into the kind of impersonal, standardized ritual 
that problem-solving courts were designed to replace (in other words, 
McTreatment substituting for McJustice). The NACDL Report 
 
 127. For a provocative illustration of how client counseling can entail a litigation-like 
performance, see Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t Takin’ No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young 
People Facing Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 17 (2007) (recounting an attempt to 
persuade a client to accept what she believed to be an extremely favorable plea offer: ―I did my 
best to engage Benny. I asked questions. I urged him to ask me questions. I shared the police 
and investigative reports with him. I used ‗silence,‘ sitting quietly with Benny while everything 
sunk in.‖). 
 128. Dinerstein et al., supra note 116, at 291; see also Scherr, supra note 116, at 270 (―The 
lawyer-client relationship entails a negotiation of extraordinary fluidity and depth.‖). 
 129. NOLAN, supra note 23, at 124 (relating the story of one participant who encountered 
resistance from his probation officer because he preferred to talk about his substance abuse in a 
religion-tinged idiom of demonic possession rather than the preferred medical image of 
disease). 
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highlighted the fact that private counsel have largely been excluded 
from problem-solving courts.
130
 The absence of an outsider‘s 
perspective increases the danger that defenders who are a regular 
presence in the court will be co-opted through their daily 
collaboration with the members of the court team. Clinic students and 
faculty, by virtue of their insider-outsider status (i.e., the ability to 
participate as part of the team, but to maintain distance and 
perspective because they are not present everyday), can make a 
special contribution to the workings of the court, holding the process 
to the measure of its commitments and making powerful the client‘s 
imagined presence.
131
 
B. Narrative Modes of Problem-Solving Lawyering 
Narrative theory, a powerful element of much clinical teaching,
132
 
proceeds from the recognition that problems, or ―trouble,‖ are an 
essential component of any story.
133
 Without trouble, there is no 
motivation to generate the change that gives the narrative its drive. 
Often, this problem or trouble becomes apparent through conflict. 
Problem-solving courts are designed to foster change by minimizing 
conflict and eliminating the initial problem. Such courts present 
distinctive challenges for clinicians committed to teaching students 
how to wield the power of narrative. Students will not be effective in 
team meetings if they advocate as if they were delivering a closing 
argument before a jury.
134
 Instead of novel or arresting images with 
 
 130. NACDL REPORT, supra note 6, at 34 (―The drug court model favors institutional 
players; some even forbid appearances by private counsel. Moreover, the required frequent 
appearances, sometimes with little or no notice, further discourage private counsel from 
representing clients.‖). 
 131. See PETERS, supra note 99; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Alper et al., supra note 37, at 1–32; Philip N. Meyer, Making the Narrative Move: 
Observations Based Upon Reading Gerry Spence’s Closing Argument in The Estate of Karen 
Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee, Inc., 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 229 (2002). 
 133. See Alper et al., supra note 37, at 22–30.  
 134. See Aaronson, supra note 111, at 251 n.8. Aaronson relates one illustration of lack of 
judgment by a lawyer who failed to calibrate his performance to the setting. Meeting with 
welfare officials to discuss the implementation of new regulations, the lawyer ―insisted on 
arguing points of law as though he were in a courtroom. He was totally unmindful of the 
purpose of the meeting and what might be helpful and persuasive in the particular situation.‖ 
Id.; see also Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for this 
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 35 (2001) (faulting traditional law school 
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bold, dramatic story arcs, students will tell stories of incremental 
progress or setbacks and will persuade primarily through ethos, 
acknowledging the team‘s contribution to the client‘s success. 
Listening skills will be at least as important as speaking.
135
 It is only 
through wise listening that the students will learn the idioms and 
register of the group‘s discourse and will sense the moments when 
speaking will have the desired impact. This does not mean they need 
to agree with other team members all the time. Principled 
disagreement ought to be welcomed. It does mean, however, that they 
must demonstrate genuine respect for the views of others, and, at the 
start of the process, some appreciation for the experience and 
expertise the team members have with these sorts of cases. This is not 
unlike the sort of genuine-but-not-disabling deference with which 
lawyers should face a judge presiding over a bench trial.
136
 The 
advocate‘s goal is not to get the upper hand on an opponent but 
instead to work in step with a fellow venturer. An effective advocate 
in such settings must be able to perceive and respond to feedback on 
an ongoing basis.  
C. Collaboration, Inter-Disciplinarity, and the Reach of the Problem-
Solving Model 
Collaboration is often an essential feature of clinic practice and 
pedagogy. Students collaborate with student-partners assigned to 
work with them on cases.
137
 They collaborate, formally and 
 
curriculum for failing to teach students to ―determine what the limitations of a given forum 
might be and determine how best to work within that forum‖). 
 135. Baker & Zawid, supra note 104, at 738–39. The authors give the following example: 
[W]hile so much emphasis in traditional skills training is placed on speaking, the 
emphasis in Therapeutic Jurisprudence is on listening. By placing a focus on listening, 
students are better able to understand the opinions and concerns of other team 
members and client. Since so much emphasis is placed on team meetings, advocacy 
skills are honed in this setting. Albeit different from courtroom arguments, students 
learn to espouse their views and recommendations in a manner that focuses on 
consensus building. 
Id. 
 136. For a discussion of managing dialogue and feedback in bench trials, see Paul Holland, 
Sharing Stories: Narrative Lawyering in Bench Trials, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2009). 
 137. See David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker: Student Collaboration in Clinical 
Programs, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 199 (1994). 
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informally, with the other teams of students working on similar cases, 
and, of course, they collaborate with the faculty supervisor 
supporting and guiding their representation and learning. In addition, 
many clinics include non-lawyer participants (e.g., social workers, 
doctors, mental health professionals) who bring special knowledge to 
the clinic‘s work. Problem-solving practice adds an additional 
collaborative dimension to clinical education in that the students must 
learn to perform successfully within the court‘s inter-disciplinary 
team concept. Problem-solving practice de-centers the lawyer, 
enabling faculty to teach a more robust version of interdisciplinarity. 
The other professionals are not working merely to carry out the 
lawyer‘s strategic objectives. Instead, the notion of control by any 
one individual or agency is questionable in this setting. This aspect of 
problem-solving clinics is likely to appeal to the ―Millenial‖ 
generation, whose members are frequently depicted as ―team-
oriented‖ and inclined to ―like and understand the importance of 
teamwork.‖138  
This team orientation presents challenges and opportunities for 
clinical faculty as well. The first challenge is one of letting go, or 
relaxing the bonds between student and teacher. Just as lawyers 
representing clients in problem-solving court must come to trust the 
other actors and to allow them greater access to and responsibility for 
the client, so must clinicians teaching in this setting allow and 
encourage the other team members to play a significant role in the 
students‘ development. Clinicians must retain the same insider-
outsider perspective on the student‘s progress as a lawyer must with 
respect to a client. They must model professional respect and 
facilitate appropriate critique.  
One of the simplest yet potentially most rewarding ways to teach 
this particular form of collaboration will be through the standard 
clinical practice of well-constructed simulations. The multiplicity of 
actors in team meetings provides a wide array of roles for students to 
inhabit, thus enabling many students to be involved. Faculty could 
invite some or all of the actual treatment team members to observe or 
participate in such simulations (live or via video recording) and to 
 
 138. Susan K. McClellan, Externships for Millennial Generation Law Students: Bridging 
the Generation Gap, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 261 (2009). 
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critique the students‘ performance. Such an invitation would be 
useful on many levels. Invitations to teach are an implicit 
communication of respect and would likely ingratiate the teacher and 
students to the other professionals. Students and faculty would obtain 
high-quality information as to how the non-lawyer professionals 
think in role and how they perceive the communications of other 
team members. In turn, having encouraged the professionals to 
articulate the rationale for what they do (or what they think they are 
doing), the law students and faculty could engage these non-lawyer 
colleagues in dialogue that might influence their work in the future. 
The thoroughgoing attention to collaboration in the classroom and 
at the courthouse will equip students for a wide range of post-
graduate experiences. The emerging field of collaborative family 
law
139
 is perhaps the most obvious. In a ―collaborative‖ divorce 
process, each party, although represented by counsel, agrees to forgo 
adversarial litigation and to facilitate the disclosure of pertinent 
information. The similarities with problem-solving court practice, 
already obvious, can be extended to include the participation of non-
lawyer experts whose knowledge will help the family solve problems 
in a broad range of areas: finance, child development, and 
psychological and emotional health.
140
 Collaborative law offers a 
particularly powerful parallel for problem-solving court practice 
because it is both voluntary and, often, expensive.
141
 The fact that 
individuals with considerable financial resources are prepared to 
forfeit their rights to have a gladiator-lawyer pursuing their goals is a 
 
 139. See SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN ET AL., COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 245–66 (2004). 
 140. See id. at 13 (―Collaborative law moves the focus of the matter away from the threat 
or expectation of a courtroom battle and puts the parties, their lawyers, and other specialists to 
work as a single problem-solving unit.‖). Like the problem-solving court movement, the 
collaborative law movement also has an accepted creation-story, rooted in an epiphany 
experienced by Stuart Webb, a long-time Minnesota practitioner who had exhausted his 
tolerance for the needless pain and misery which resulted from the traditional scorched-earth 
approach to divorce litigation. See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: Practicing Without 
Armor, Practicing With Heart, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW 
AS A HEALING PROFESSION, supra note 5, at 259, 267. 
 141. The University of Virginia Family Dispute Resolution Clinic offers a rare example of 
an attempt to extend the benefits of the collaborative approach to parties of limited means. See 
Family Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law. 
virginia.edu/html/academics/practical/family_adr.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).  
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powerful testament to the perceived benefits of non-adversarial legal 
problem-solving and at least a partial answer to concerns that 
criminal law problem-solving courts are designed to take advantage 
of clients with limited resources. The parallel is not perfect, of 
course. The state is not a party to a divorce. More significantly, 
collaborative divorce practice does not countenance making 
important decisions in the absence of the parties. Rather, participation 
by the parties is deemed essential to the process of devising a long-
term solution.
142
 Even this distinction is not total, however. Leading 
collaborative practitioners recognize that the experience of divorce 
(and the process toward it) can have a highly destabilizing impact on 
clients, rendering them temporarily incapable of keeping sight of, let 
alone achieving, their long-term goals, much as clients suffering from 
addiction or mental illness often experience.
143
  
The developing influence of these two models, each in a field long 
characterized as high in conflict, is likely to fuel change in other 
practice areas as well, and problem-solving clinic graduates will be 
well suited for these new opportunities. William Simon has written 
that the skills required of defense counsel in problem-solving courts 
are similar to those already employed by transactional lawyers
144
 or 
 
 142. SHERRIE R. ABNEY, AVOIDING LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO CIVIL COLLABORATIVE LAW 
11 (2005) (―Nothing is decided unless the parties are present.‖); GUTTERMAN ET AL., supra note 
139, at 81 (―The essential work in a collaborative law case happens transparently—in the open, 
in front of and in conjunctions with clients—usually in meetings where clients, counsel, and 
any other pertinent team members are present.‖). 
 143. See GUTTERMAN ET AL., supra note 139, at 22. Gutterman and her co-authors quote 
Pauline Tesler, experienced family lawyer and collaborative law pioneer, describing what she 
might say to a client who, in such a raw emotional state, might request that counsel engage in 
traditional practices, such as withholding information or unnecessary litigation: ―You are 
currently not the person who I contracted to conduct this collaborative law process with. That 
person is your higher self, and it is from her that I take direction.‖ Id. For an account of a quite 
similar lawyering perspective from a legendary lawyer in the traditional heroic mode, see EVAN 
THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS: ULTIMATE INSIDER; LEGENDARY 
TRIAL LAWYER 177–80 (1991). 
 144. Simon, supra note 54, at 1605. Simon observes:  
In litigation, especially criminal litigation, representatives of adverse parties do not 
usually consider themselves as part of a ‗team.‘ Yet, the idea seems less jarring in 
transactional work, where parties with adverse interests typically work, sometimes on 
a long-term basis, to pursue overlapping goals collaboratively. In many ways, it makes 
sense to see drug court practice as transactional, rather than as a kind of litigation. 
Id. 
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those representing business clients in highly regulated industries.
145
 
The ability to achieve one‘s objectives in a group decision-making 
process also has obvious relevance for public policy-making arenas 
(everything from a city council to a legislative committee) as well as 
the internal decision-making processes of law firms (both public and 
private). There is little opportunity within the law school curriculum 
for students to apply sustained effort to thinking about and working 
through the challenges of successful group processes. 
Students‘ ability to apply the lessons of problem-solving clinics in 
these disparate post-graduate practice settings will provide a measure 
of the extent to which the clinic faculty who taught them have 
achieved what learning theorists refer to as ―far transfer,‖ i.e., 
students‘ ability to adapt the lessons from a learning experience to a 
context that is markedly dissimilar.
146
 Problem-solving courts exhibit 
elements that David Binder, Albert Moore, and Paul Bergman cite in 
their description of a learning environment conducive to transfer: (1) 
student practice is situated within a conceptual framework; (2) 
students have multiple opportunities for practice; (3) the practice is 
spread out over time; and (4) students experience a gradual increase 
in task complexity.
147
 Although improvised into existence, problem-
solving courts have developed within a clearly-designed conceptual 
framework. Moreover, because these courts remain an alternative to 
the standard model of criminal justice, teachers must explicitly 
elaborate that new framework. A problem-solving court clinic can 
reliably provide students multiple opportunities for practice that are 
spread out over time and feature an increase in complexity.  
In a traditional criminal trial clinic, faculty will be hesitant to 
assign students too many cases, lest they all wind up going to trial, 
leaving the students overwhelmed and/or leaving the faculty 
 
 145. Id. at 1600. As with collaborative law, the fact that this model of lawyering is 
employed to serve powerful actors suggests that it cannot be automatically dismissed as non-
viable with respect to indigent criminal defendants. However, Simon‘s business lawyers have 
historically had considerable ability to influence the nature of the regulation to which their 
clients are subjected. It is too soon to say whether problem-solving courts will allow criminal 
defense lawyers similar influence in the long-term. 
 146. David A. Binder, Albert J. Moore & Paul Bergman, A Depositions Course: Tackling 
the Challenge of Teaching for Professional Skills Transfer, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 871, 883 
(2007). 
 147. Id. at 884–87. 
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scrambling to re-allocate or assume responsibility. Moreover, as 
much as a teacher might wish to stage students‘ assumption of 
responsibility, once a case is open, it is all open. A client in a 
traditional criminal case is quite likely to want to know at the first 
meeting with his lawyer what sentence(s) he faces. To answer that, 
the students need to integrate their understanding of the statutes under 
which he has been charged, the applicable sentencing schemes, the 
potential factual developments achievable through discovery and 
investigation, and many other issues related to the pre-trial, trial, and 
post-trial stages. The all-encompassing nature of this work is what 
makes it so exhilarating at the start; so rewarding at the end when, in 
fact, the students have pulled it all together; and so frustrating when a 
case ends indeterminately or anti-climactically due to a client‘s 
disappearance or re-arrest. Unlike trials, team meetings in problem-
solving court are almost certain to happen once scheduled. They are 
not subject to being negotiated away and they are unlikely to get 
continued, although the resolution of some issues may be deferred. In 
fact, because the meetings take place before the clients are due to 
appear for court, even a client absence—the plague of many clinics 
working on traditional misdemeanors—will not prevent the meeting 
from occurring. It is generally easy to identify the issues that will be 
addressed, and the relevant facts will be shared. Thus, a student ought 
to be able to begin handling cases in team meetings fairly early in the 
semester. This relatively short build-up time enables a supervisor to 
assign cases over the course of the term in light of their complexity. 
As the student gains confidence, learns from experience, and 
establishes relationships with the rest of the team, she can take on 
more challenging work. Of course, the characteristics that make team 
meetings—like the depositions that Binder, Moore and Bergman use 
for teaching—easier for students may also render them a less 
complete or demanding lawyering experience.  
D. Finding the Time and a Place for Reflection 
Clinical teachers aspire to do more than train students in the 
mechanics of effective practice.
148
 Anthony Amsterdam described 
 
 148. This is not to denigrate more prosaic subjects, such as how one organizes one‘s work, 
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clinical education as perhaps the only means of fulfilling ―a major 
function of law schools . . . to give students systematic training in 
effective techniques for learning law from the experience of 
practicing law.‖149 Through structured supervision, which means 
much more than mere oversight, clinicians aim to teach ―rule, 
doctrine, policy, and procedure.‖150 Taking advantage of students‘ 
immersion in their clients‘ cases, faculty guide them to reflect upon 
and synthesize concepts and extract lessons that may elude them in 
the less contextualized engagement that occurs in some other 
courses.
151
 Ann Shalleck has described how clinical teachers can 
assist students to reflect on the interplay between theory and 
experience: 
[Theory] can be helpful in increasing our awareness of the 
assumptions we bring to representation for women who have 
been abused, evaluating our emerging conceptions of this 
representation, fashioning alternative models, identifying 
lawyering practices through which the models can be realized, 
and exploring pedagogical methods that would enable students 
to learn how to provide and critique the practices that the 
aspirational models describe.
152
 
. . . . 
 
which contain essential professional lessons and warrant considerable time and attention in a 
clinic. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS‘N, AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE 
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) (listing management of legal work among 
fundamental professional skills).  
 149. Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 613. 
 150. Goldfarb, supra note 111, at 1654. 
 151. Shalleck, supra note 14, at 139. Shalleck recalls: 
[T]he supervisor used case theory to integrate aspects of the client‘s life with the law 
and the legal system. . . . Case theory provided the entry point for discussing the 
client‘s experience, the students‘ understanding of that experience, the judge‘s 
understanding of that experience, the doctrinal structure of the law of domestic 
violence, and the relationship of the court and the law to that experience. 
Id. 
 152. Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between 
Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 
1028 (1997). 
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[T]he work of representing women who have been abused can 
create a critical vantage point from which to evaluate and 
challenge the theories about women who have been abused 
that dominate the legal world.
153
  
This type of reflection also teaches students broadly applicable meta-
lessons about the relationship between theory and practice and the 
interplay of power, doctrine, and justice.
154
 
The power of reflection as a teaching tool derives from the ability 
of students and faculty to invest considerable time in the process. 
Supervision meetings often include a great deal of time spent on 
aspects of the representation that likely go unexamined in most 
lawyers‘ practice, where time is at a premium and consideration of 
one client‘s case comes at the expense of those of several others. 
Describing clinical practice as occurring ―in slow motion,‖155 Jane 
Aiken et al. illustrate this inefficiency (as a form of practice) and 
value (as a form of learning) by discussing the example of a student 
team entering a meeting with faculty with differing (and previously 
unshared) views as to which they should do first: read the case file or 
interview the client.
156
 By forcing the students to resolve this issue, 
the faculty teach a valuable lesson about how even the most simple 
practices can contain unexamined assumptions and unexplored 
possibilities.  
Problem-solving courts demand high-speed practice. This not only 
complicates clinicians‘ ability to create a reflective environment, it 
can deprive them of even more basic teaching tools. Clinical teachers 
regularly reassure students that they can overcome their relative 
inexperience by exploiting their comparative advantages of time, 
focused energy, and a limited caseload. ―You will know the facts and 
 
 153. Id. at 1040. 
 154. Shalleck, supra note 14, at 158 (describing how a teacher‘s intervention in the 
discussion of a case with students ―invited critique of the institutional setting‖); see also Susan 
Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A “Signature Pedagogy” for Clinical Education, 14 
CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 216 (2007) (describing how reflection in case rounds addresses both 
issues of professional behavior and institutional reform: ―In addition to using this process to 
understand lawyering activity, this process also is essential for exploring the complexities of 
lawyering for social justice.‖). 
 155. Aiken et al., supra note 111, at 1054. 
 156. Id. at 1070 n.77. 
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the law better than anyone else in the case‖ is a clinician‘s mantra 
and often a frazzled student‘s lifeline. The structure of problem-
solving courts negates this advantage. Legal issues arise quite rarely. 
Superior command of the facts may not even be a meaningful 
aspiration in a world in which ―many . . . cases are not dealing with 
disputed issues of fact.‖157 In these courts, information is generally 
held in common rather than for advantage. It is also often developed 
very late in the process, at the team meeting, when the various actors 
present their updates, creating the composite picture of the 
participant‘s progress which will form the basis of the court‘s action. 
In theory, clinic students could contact team members and obtain 
preview versions of their individual reports, thus obtaining a glimpse 
of the portrait of the client in its embryonic form. However, there is 
no guarantee that any of these actors will have the information or the 
opportunity to share it before the meeting. More importantly, asking 
for such special treatment risks compromising the clinic‘s place 
within the community of the court.
158
 Clinicians are accustomed to 
holding other actors in the justice system to a standard above the 
everyday norm. Prosecutors anticipate more motions when a clinic is 
involved. Landlords‘ lawyers have a harder time achieving 
settlement. In these examples, the ―clinic difference‖ is truly a badge 
of honor. The clinic can credibly claim to be forcing the other actors 
to raise their level of practice. Requiring early reporting on mental 
health court clients represented by the clinic cannot be said to 
promote similar effects. Instead, the extra work is likely to be 
perceived as redundant, distracting, and just plain baffling. Because 
the rhythms of problem-solving practice are somewhat at odds with 
the sort of reflection that Aiken and Shalleck describe, teachers may 
have to work a bit harder to create an environment in which reflection 
 
 157. Panel Discussion, The Changing Face of Justice: The Evolution of Problem Solving, 
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1790, 1811 (2002). 
 158. As the Seattle University Mental Health Court Clinic was about to open, the faculty 
and clinic administrators involved heard from others who worked at the court that the court 
liaison, one of the critical staff members, had been voicing her concern that the arrival of the 
students would likely disrupt the work of the team. This woman‘s history of commitment to the 
defendants in the court and the integrity of the process made it impossible to dismiss her 
concern as the grumbling of a bureaucrat who sought to avoid work or who failed to appreciate 
the importance of effective defense advocacy. 
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can take place. This may require a greater reliance on case rounds, 
―facilitated classroom conversations in which [students] discuss with 
each other their cases or projects.‖159 In rounds,  
students engage with peers in a professional dialogue that 
reinforces professional reasoning and ethical decision-making. 
Students learn that the support from a group of other 
professionals engaged in honest and supportive dialogue can 
lighten the stresses of law practice. Finally, students develop 
skills that will enable them to learn from their experience and 
from other professionals both in the clinic and in their future 
practices.
160
 
Rounds offer students access to the thoughts and experience of the 
entire class. They also, at least potentially, enable a faculty member 
to engage in one deep conversation that addresses a common problem 
from multiple angles and experiences, rather than three or four 
somewhat similar supervisory conversations, each primarily 
dominated by the salient features (and unique and often pressing 
demands) of the particular case in question. 
The benefits of operating a problem-solving court clinic will be 
even greater for schools that already offer (and will continue to offer) 
clinical opportunities in traditional criminal courts. Because each 
system (and each role) is more than sufficiently challenging to master 
on its own, it would be difficult to have the same students 
simultaneously practicing in both courts.
161
 However, the potential 
for learning from experience in both settings is vast.
162
 Rounds 
sessions with students from both courts would offer a wonderful 
opportunity to test the assumptions underlying each system and the 
purported limits on attorney conduct in each. Students might compare 
notes on subjects such as: (1) the frequency and nature of contact 
with clients; (2) the occasions on and manner in which students felt 
 
 159. Bryant & Milstein, supra note 154, at 196. 
 160.  Id. 
 161. The competency litigation that takes place within a mental health court does provide 
material within a single clinic for a comparison of the different models of attorney role.  
 162. See Baker & Zawid, supra note 104, at 732 (―Students in traditional placements would 
be forced to compare the services they were providing with these alternative models. By the 
same token, however, I expected students in traditional criminal placements to challenge and 
engage the therapeutic court externs and provide periodic reality checks.‖).  
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they had a chance to advocate for a client and the results they 
obtained; and (3) indications that either system was achieving its 
objectives. Much like lawyers in problem-solving court must learn to 
emphasize some skills over others in their new practice settings, so 
will clinical teachers need to adjust their approach to ensure that 
students maximize their learning in problem-solving court clinics. 
CONCLUSION 
Clinical law teachers have long sought to engender within legal 
practice a more active and shared process of learning. Problem-
solving courts can be genuine and multi-directional learning 
environments. When such courts achieve their goals, participants gain 
insight into their difficulties and the possible means of overcoming 
them. Lawyers and other professionals genuinely share their 
analytical skills and respective bodies of knowledge without fear of 
surrendering a hard-fought advantage. Judges and court 
administrators have the opportunity for systematic analysis of the 
impact of their practices on the lives of those before them.  
To date, many in the criminal defense community have resisted 
the advance of these courts. Part I of this Article called upon 
defenders to examine their own resistance as critically as they have 
examined the development of the problem-solving model. In other 
words, defenders must suspend, if not abandon, the assumptions that 
the changes wrought by problem-solving courts are both designed 
and destined to shortchange defendants, in part by eliminating any 
meaningful role for counsel for the accused. Solid evidence suggests 
that these courts promise substantial benefits for at least some 
defendants. It is also apparent that defenders have the opportunity to 
preserve a distinctive voice, but only if they are willing to move 
beyond long-entrenched positions, positions that have been the 
foundation for a robust practice culture and ethos but that do not 
necessarily respond to the challenges of this modern form of practice.  
Clinical teachers and students can plan an important role in 
guiding the development of the vision and the practice in these 
courts. With some refinement of traditional clinical pedagogy, 
problem-solving court clinics can provide the opportunity for 
students to develop the traditional legal skills of judgment, planning, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 34:185 
 
 
and persuasion and the bedrock value of commitment to clients, all in 
settings that demand and reward emotional intelligence in ways that 
traditional courts seldom do. Moreover, clinicians‘ commitment to 
reflective practice and their roots in the defender community make 
them potentially valuable contributors to the currently unsatisfactory 
dialogue between the crusading and currently ascending proponents 
of these new courts and the still highly skeptical defenders.  
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